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1993] GIFT TAX ANNUAL EXCLUSION
If one were drafting a gift tax statute ab initio, transfers of prop-
erty below a certain value would be exempted in order to make the
tax politically acceptable and administratively workable., The annual
exclusion provided by Internal Revenue Code § 2503(b)2 furnishes
such an exemption under current federal tax law. The exclusion af-
fords taxpayers valuable relief from the gift and estate tax system.3
Every individual may make unlimited gifts of present interests in
property having an aggregate value of $10,000 per donee each calendar
year without having to pay any gift tax4 or file a gift tax return.5 Sub-
stantial amounts can be transferred free of gift and estate taxation
through use of the annual exclusion.6
Any provision that offers complete exemption from taxation and is
provided on an annual, noncumulative basis is apt to encourage usage.
Taxpayers, not surprisingly, have sought to obtain the maximum ben-
efit of the annual exclusion. The exclusion is one of the reasons life-
time gifting is perhaps the most important device available to reduce
transfer taxation.7
1. W. LEsLIE PEAT & STEPHANIE J. WniLBANKs, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXA-
TION: AN ANALYSIS AND CRIQuE § 7.06, at 92 (1991).
2. I.R.C. § 2503(b). The text of the provision is as follows:
Exclusion from gifts. - In the case of gifts (other than gifts of future
interests in property) made to any person by the donor during the calen-
dar year, the first $10,000 of such gifts to such person shall not, for pur-
poses of subsection (a), be included in the total amount of gifts made
during such year. Where there has been a transfer to any person of a
present interest in property, the possibility that such interest may be
diminished by the exercise of a power shall be disregarded in applying
this subsection, if no part of such interest will at any time pass to any
other person.
All references herein are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended and
in effect on the date of this article, unless otherwise indicated.
3. See text accompanying notes 466-70 infra. Although the annual exclusion pro-
tects property transferred from gift taxation, certain transferred property may,
nonetheless, be included in donor's gross estate for estate tax purposes. See I.R.C.
§§ 2035-2038.
4. See I.R.C. §§ 2501, 2503.
5. I.R.C. § 6019 (providing that any individual who, in any calendar year, makes a
transfer by gift, other than transfers excluded by the annual exclusion under
§ 2503(b), the tuition and medical expense exclusion under § 2503(e), or for which
the marital deduction is allowed under § 2523, shall file a gift tax return for such
year).
6. See text accompanying notes 466-70 infra.
7. See George Cooper, A Voluntary Tax? New Perspectives on Sophisticated Estate
Tax Avoidance, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 161, 191 (1977); Louis S. Harrison, The Strate-
gic Use of Lifetime Gifting Programs To Reduce Estate Taxes in Light of Recent
Congressional and Internal Revenue Service Antipathy Towards Transfer Tax
Reduction Devices, 40 DE PAUL L. REV. 365, 366 (1991); John R. Price, In-
trafamily Transfers: Blessed and More Blessed Ways to Give, 18 INST. ON EST.
PLAN. 6-1, 6-2 (1984). See also Owen G. Fiore & John F. Ramsbacher, Crummey
Powers for Contingent Beneficiaries OK'd, 19 EST. PLAN. 10, 10 (1992); Richard
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Maximum benefit of the annual exclusion, however, has often been
sought for interests or in circumstances that raise questions regarding
the proper limits of the exclusion.8 Donors have not been content to
make outright transfers of property to donees. Many have transferred
property in trusts and created numerous equitable interests for which
the annual exclusion has been claimed.9 The question of whether the
transfer of particular interests qualifies for the exclusion has resulted
in much litigationlO and numerous administrative rulings."
While taxpayers are entitled to make maximum use of tax deduc-
tions and exclusions in order to minimize or avoid taxes,12 the annual
exclusion is a matter of legislative grace and is to be strictly con-
strued.13 The exclusion should not be allowed for interests or in cir-
cumstances that are inconsistent with the purposes that supported its
enactment. Form should not be allowed to prevail over substance.14
W. Harris & Steven W. Jacobson, Maximizing the Effectiveness of the Annual
Gift Exclusion, 70 TAXES 204, 204 (1992).
8. See Cooper, supra note 7, at 234-35.
9. See, e.g., Crummey v. Commissioner, 397 F.2d 82 (9th Cir. 1968); Estate of Cris-
tofani v. Commissioner, 97 T.C. 74 (1991), acq. in result, 1992-1 C.B. 1.
10. Jeffrey G. Sherman, 'Tis a Gift to be Simple: The Need for a New Definition of
"Future Interest"for Gift Tax Purposes, 55 U. CIN. L. REv. 585, 585 (1987)("The
most troublesome and most frequently litigated issue in gift tax law is undoubt-
edly the availability of the 'annual exclusion' authorized by section
2503(b).")(footnote omitted); see also Albert Krassner, The Trouble Spots of the
Gift Tax: A Haunting Ground for the Tax Planner, 22 J. TAX'N 346, 346 (1965).
11. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 85-24, 1985-1 C.B. 329; Rev. Rul. 83-108, 1983-2 C.B. 168; Rev.
Rul. 81-7, 1981-1 C.B. 474; Rev. RUl. 80-261, 1980-2 C.B. 279; Rev. RUl. 79-47, 1979-1
C.B. 312; Rev. Rul. 76-360, 1976-2 C.B. 298; Rev. RUl. 75-506, 1975-2 C.B. 375; Rev.
Rul. 75-415, 1975-2 C.B. 374; Rev. Rul. 73-405, 1973-2 C.B. 321; see also L. Henry
Gissel, Jr. & Robert J. Rosepink, Irrevocable Trusts and Crummey Powers, 15
PROB. NOTEs 128 (1989)(reviewing numerous administrative rulings issued in con-
nection with demand powers).
12. Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935)("The legal right of a taxpayer to
decrease the amount of what otherwise would be his taxes, or altogether avoid
them, by means which the law permits, cannot be doubted.")(citations omitted);
see Johnson v. Commissioner, 86 F.2d 710, 712 (2d Cir. 1936); Perkins v. Commis-
sioner, 27 T.C. 601, 606 (1956).
13. Estate of Levine v. Commissioner, 526 F.2d 717, 721 (2d Cir. 1975) ("[W]e cannot be
unmindful of the rule of construction that Congress permits exclusions only as a
matter of grace, and the exclusions sections are to be strictly construed against
the taxpayer. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 338 F.2d 4, 8 (2d Cir. 1964);
Bingler v. Johnson, 394 U.S. 741, 752, 89 S.Ct. 1439, 22 L.Ed.2d 695 (1969)."); Gil-
more v. Commissioner, 20 T.C. 579, 586 (1953), rev'd on other grounds, 213 F.2d
520 (6th Cir. 1954)("Section 1003(b)(3)[the annual exclusion] grants an exclusion
which amounts to a tax exemption and must therefore be strictly con-
strued.")(citation omitted); cf. Helvering v. Northwest Steel Rolling Mills, 311
U.S. 46, 49 (1940).
14. The Supreme Court has long recognized the substance over form doctrine in tax
matters. In Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561 (1978) the Court held:
In applying this doctrine of substance over form, the Court has looked to
the objective economic realities of a transaction rather than to the partic-
[Vol. 72:106
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The Internal Revenue Service and the courts should use common
sense in deciding whether a transfer qualifies for the exclusion. Fail-
ure to do so undermines the estate and income tax protective purpose
of the gift tax.15
The gift tax supports the estate tax and the annual exclusion pro-
vides a necessary, but limited, exemption from the gift tax. The exclu-
sion should allow taxpayers to make customary and occasional gifts of
relatively small value without triggering the gift tax or its reporting
requirements. It should be a simple provision that easily accomplishes
its limited objectives. It should not encourage lifetime transfers in
lieu of death transfers in order to reduce estate taxes. The annual
exclusion, however, has proved to be anything but simple, and signifi-
cant estate tax avoidance possibilities exist through routine use of the
exclusion.6
Recent administrative announcements 17 and court decisions's pro-
vide the occasion for reconsidering the annual exclusion. This article
will examine the role of the exclusion in the gift and estate tax sys-
tem, the purposes that supported its enactment, and the availability of
the exclusion for certain transfers. I conclude that the annual exclu-
sion is currently allowed for transfers of certain interests that are in-
consistent with the original limited purposes of the exclusion and that
such allowances impair the estate tax protective function of the gift
tax. Annual exclusion reform will be proposed.
ular form the parties employed. The Court has never regarded "the sim-
ple expedient of drawing up papers," Commissioner v. Tower, 327 U.S.
280, 291 (1946), as controlling for tax purposes when the objective eco-
nomic realities are to the contrary.
Id at 573.
In Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945) the Court
expounded:
The incidence of taxation depends upon the substance of a transac-
tion.... A sale by one person cannot be transformed for tax purposes
into a sale by another by using the latter as a conduit through which to
pass title. To permit the true nature of a transaction to be disguised by
mere formalisms, which exist solely to alter tax liabilities, would seri-
ously impair the effective administration of the tax policies of Congress.
IA. at 334 (footnote omitted); see also Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469-70
(1935).
15. Cf. Dickman v. Commissioner, 465 U.S. 330, 338 (1984).
16. See text accompanying notes 466-70 infra.
17. See, e.g., Tech. Adv. Mem. 91-41-008 (June 24, 1991); Tech. Adv. Mem. 90-45-002
(July 27, 1990); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-30-005 (Apr. 19, 1990); Tech. Adv. Mem. 87-27-
003 (Mar. 16, 1987).
18. See, e.g., Heyen v. United States, 945 F.2d 359 (10th Cir. 1991); Estate of Cristofani
v. Commissioner, 97 T.C. 74 (1991), acq. in result, 1992-1 C.B. 1.
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I. THE FEDERAL GIFT TAX
A. Legislative History19
The federal estate tax was enacted in 1916.20 The tax, however,
was not accompanied by a gift tax and could generally be avoided by
gift transfers during life.21 Congress partially addressed this estate
tax avoidance problem by requiring that the value of property trans-
ferred "in contemplation of death" be included in decedents' gross es-
tates for estate tax purposes.22 Scrutiny of the circumstances
surrounding inter vivos transfers, however, imposed a heavy burden
on tax administrators.23 "Life motives" and "death motives" were
used by courts in determining whether transfers had been made "in
contemplation of death."24 The results under this approach were un-
satisfactory2 5 and contributed to enactment of a federal gift tax26 in
192427 as a necessary corollary to estate and income taxes. 28
The 1924 gift tax was determined annually and was not cumula-
tive.2 9 A $50,000 annual exemption 30 and a $500 per donee annual ex-
clusion3' were provided. The gift tax, consequently, could be avoided
by spreading gifts over several years using the large annual
exemption.32
The gift tax was repealed as of January 1, 1926,33 as part of an over-
all reduction in federal taxes after the federal government's fiscal
health improved.34 The depression that occurred shortly thereafter,
19. See Bradford L. Ferguson, Frederic W. Hickman & Donald C. Lubick,
Reexamining the Nature and Role of Tax Legislative History in Light of the
Changing Realities of the Process, 67 TAxEs 804, 804 (1989)("Analysis almost
invariably starts with the proposition that it is the statute alone that is 'the law.'
'Legislative history' is generally agreed to be controlling to the extent that it
legitimately helps to discover the original meaning that the statutory words were
intended to carry.").
20. Revenue Act of 1916, Pub. L. No. 64-271, §§ 200-212, 39 Stat. 756, 777-80.
21. LEwis D. SOLOMON, IRA M. BLOOM & JOHN T. GAuBATZ, FEDERAL TAXATION OF
ESTATES, TRusTs AND GIrS § 1.01, at 4 (1989).
22. Revenue Act of 1916, Pub. L. No. 64-271, § 202(b), 39 Stat. 756, 777-78.
23. See T. Ludlow Chrystie, Death Taxes and Gift Taxes on Inter Vivos Transfers -
Their Correlation, 14 TAXES 716, 716 (1936).
24. SOLOMON, supra note 21, § 7.02, at 346.
25. Id.
26. Id. § 1.01, at 4-5; Chrystie, supra note 23, at 716.
27. Revenue Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-176, §§ 319-324, 43 Stat. 253, 313-16.
28. Roswell Magill, The Federal Gift Tax, 40 COLUM. L. REv. 773, 773 (1940).
29. Revenue Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-176, §§ 319, 323, 43 Stat. 253, 313-14, 316.
30. Revenue Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-176, § 321(a)(1), 43 Stat. 253, 314.
31. Revenue Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-176, § 321(a) (3), 43 Stat. 253, 314.
32. H.R. REP. No. 708, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1932), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. (Part 2)
457, 477; S. REP. No. 665, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1932), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. (Part
2) 496, 525.
33. Revenue Act of 1926, Pub. L. No. 69-20, § 324, 44 Stat. 9, 86.
34. Magill, supra note 28, at 774-75.
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however, meant a return to federal deficits and increased taxes.3 5 In
1932, the true antecedent of our current federal gift tax was enacted 36
as part of Congress' search for revenues.3 7
The 1932 gift tax provided a $50,000 lifetime exemption3 8 and a
$5,000 per donee annual exclusion.39 The tax was cumulative; taxable
gifts made in earlier years would affect the rate at which taxable gifts
in subsequent years would be taxed.4 0 The cumulative nature of the
tax was intended to impose a gift tax that approached the estate tax
that would have been paid had the gift not been made.4 '
The gift tax was enacted to protect the progressive income tax and
the estate tax.42 The House Ways and Means Committee and the Sen-
ate Finance Committee explained:
The gift tax will supplement both the estate tax and the income tax. It will
tend to reduce the incentive to make gifts in order that distribution of future
income from the donated property may be to a number of persons with the
result that the taxes imposed by the higher brackets of the income tax law are
avoided. It will also tend to discourage transfers for the purpose of avoiding
the estate tax.4 3
The gift tax, nonetheless, contained significant incentives for making
gifts. The gift tax was separate from the estate tax; it had its own
exemption and tax rates (set at three-fourths of the estate tax rates).44
The gift tax annual exclusion had no estate tax counterpart. The gift
tax, moreover, was tax-exclusive while the estate tax was tax-inclu-
sive.45 These factors meant that less tax would be paid if property
35. Id at 775.
36. Revenue Act of 1932, Pub. L. No. 72-154, §§ 501-532, 47 Stat. 169, 245-59.
37. See Magill, supra note 28, at 775.
38. Revenue Act of 1932, Pub. L. No. 72-154, § 505(a)(1), 47 Stat. 169, 247.
39. Revenue Act of 1932, Pub. L. No. 72-154, § 504(b), 47 Stat. 169, 247.
40. Revenue Act of 1932, Pub. L. No. 72-154, § 502, 47 Stat. 169, 246; see H.R. REP. No.
708, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1932), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. (Part 2) 457, 477; S. REP.
No. 665, 72d Cong., 1.st Sess. (1932), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. (Part 2) 496, 525.
41. H.R. REP. No. 708, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1932), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. (Part 2)
457,477; S. REP. No. 665, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1932), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. (Part
2) 496, 525.
42. Dickman v. Commissioner, 465 U.S. 330, 338 (1984)("Our holding... is fully con-
sistent with one of the major purposes of the federal gift tax statute: protection of
the estate tax and the income tax."); H.R. REP. No. 708, 72d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1932), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. (Part 2) 457, 477; S. REP. No. 665, 72d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1932), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. (Part 2). 496, 525.
43. H.R. REP. No. 708, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1932), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. (Part 2)
457,477; S. REP. No. 665, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1932), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. (Part
2) 496, 525.
44. Magill, supra note 28, at 776.
45. Harrison, supra note 7, at 384. ("The gift tax system is tax exclusive; that is, there
is no additional gift tax on the amount used to pay the gift tax. In contrast, the
estate tax is tax inclusive; in essence, there is an additional estate tax on the
amount used to pay the estate tax."); PEAT & WILLBANKs, supra note 1, § 3.02, at
27. Any gift tax paid on gifts made within three years of the donor's death, how-
ever, must be included in the donor's gross estate for estate tax purposes. I.R.C.
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were transferred during life rather than at death.46
Congress intended to remove some of these preferences for life-
time gifting and to provide a more progressive transfer tax system 47
when it combined the gift and estate taxes into a unified transfer tax
system in 1976.48 A unified rate schedule49 and unified credit5O against
the gift and estate taxes were enacted. Post-1976 taxable gifts are
taken into account in determining the tax rate on decedents' taxable
estates.51 Congress, however, did not intend to eliminate all incen-
tives for lifetime gifting52 and significant incentives to make gifts re-
main in the transfer tax system.53 One of those incentives is the
annual exclusion.54
In 1981, Congress substantially increased the amount of the unified
credit55 in order to offset the effects of inflation and to provide estate
and gift tax relief to small estates.5 6 Every taxpayer can now transfer
property having an aggregate value of $600,000 during lifetime or at
death without incurring a gift or estate tax obligation.57 It was esti-
mated in 1981 that approximately one-half of one percent of decedents
would be subject to federal transfer taxation after the phase-in of the
unified credit increases.58 The annual exclusion, consequently, is of
primary benefit as a transfer tax avoidance device for only the
wealthy.
§ 2035(c). This "gross-up" provision was intended to eliminate the incentive to
make deathbed transfers in order to remove the amount of the gift tax from the
transfer tax base. H.R. REP. No. 94-1380, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), reprinted in
1976-3 C.B. 735, 746, 748.
46. Magill, supra note 28, at 776.
47. H.R. REP. No. 94-1380, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), reprinted in 1976-3 C.B. 735,
745-46.
48. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2001, 90 Stat. 1520, 1846-54.
49. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2001(a)(1), (b)(1), 90 Stat. 1520,
1846-47, 1849; see H.R. REP. No. 94-1380, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1976), reprinted in
1976-3 C.B. 735, 739.
50. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2001(a)(2), (b)(2), 90 Stat. 1520,
1848, 1849.
51. I.R.C. § 2001(b).
52. H.R. REP. No. 94-1380, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), reprinted in 1976-3 C.B. 735,
746.
53. PEAT & WILLBANSi, supra note 1, § 7.06, at 94.
54. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1380, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), reprinted in 1976-3 C.B.
735, 746.
55. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 401, 95 Stat. 172,299-300.
56. H.R. REP. No. 97-201, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981), reprinted in 1981-2 C.B. 352,
376; S. REP. No. 97-144, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981), reprinted in 1981-2 C.B. 412,
460.
57. See I.R.C. §§ 2505, 2010. (The unified credit of $192,800 allows the tax-free trans-
fer of property having a value of $600,000).
58. Willard H. Pedrick, Oh, To Die Down Under! Abolition of Death and Gift Duties
in Australia, 35 TAx LAw. 113, 113 (1981).
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B. Transfers Subject to Taxation
The gift tax is a comprehensive tax5 9 imposed on property trans-
ferred by gift.60 It reaches all transactions to the extent that "prop-
erty or a property right is donatively passed to or conferred upon
another, regardless of the means or the device employed in its accom-
plishment."61 The tax, subject to certain limitations, is imposed on all
property transferred by gift, regardless of whether the transfer is out-
right or in trust, direct or indirect, and regardless of whether the prop-
erty transferred is real or personal, tangible or intangible.6 2 The
Supreme Court applies the gift tax broadly to effectuate Congres-
sional intent.63
Before a transfer is subject to the gift tax, the gift must be "com-
plete."64 Not all irrevocable transfers are complete for gift tax pur-
poses.65 A gift is "complete" when the donor relinquishes dominion
and control over the property, leaving him no power to change its dis-
position for the benefit of himself or another. 66
The gift tax applies when a transfer is made for which the trans-
feror does not receive full and adequate consideration in money or
59. In Dickman v. Commissioner, 465 U.S. 330 (1984) the Court noted:
The comprehensive scope of the gift tax, reflected by its statutory lan-
guage and legislative history, is analogous to that of § 61 of the Code, 26
U.S.C. § 61, which defines gross income as "all income from whatever
source derived." Section 61 has long been interpreted to include all
forms of income except those specifically excluded from its reach. See,
e.g., Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955). Similarly,
the gift tax applies to any "transfer of property by gift," Code
§ 2501(a)(1), "[slubject to the limitations contained in this chapter," Code
§ 2511(a). Accordingly, absent an express exclusion from its provisions,
any transfer meeting the statutory requirements must be held subject to
the gift tax.
Id. at 334 n.4; accord Commissioner v. Wemyss, 324 U.S. 303, 306 (1945); H.R. REP.
No. 708, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1932), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. (Part 2) 457, 476; S.
REP. No. 665, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1932), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. (Part 2) 496, 524
("The terms 'property,' 'transfer,' 'gift,' and 'indirectly' are used in the broadest
and most comprehensive sense;..
60. I.R.C. § 2501(a)(1).
61. H.R. REP. No. 708, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1932), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. (Part 2)
457, 476; S. REp. No. 665, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1932), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. (Part
2) 496, 524.
62. I.R.C. § 2511(a).
63. Dickman v. Commissioner, 465 U.S. 330 (1984); Commissioner v. Wemyss, 324
U.S. 303, 306 (1945); but see Mark J. Wolff, Dickman Confined.- The Taxation of
Gratuitous Transfers of Use, 21 STETSON L. REV. 509, 557 (1992)(criticizing Dick-
man and suggesting a restriction of "the overbroad language of Dickman").
64. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(b)(as amended in 1983).
65. E.g., Estate of Sanford v. Commissioner, 308 U.S. 39 (1939).
66. Helvering v. Hutchings, 312 U.S. 393, 396 (1941); Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(b)(as
amended in 1983); Rev. Rul. 67-396, 1967-2 C.B. 351, clarified by Rev. Rul. 84-25,
1984-1 C.B. 191.
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money's worth.67 If such consideration is received, the taxpayer's
transfer tax base is not diminished and imposing a gift tax would be
inappropriate. 68 Transfers made in the ordinary course of business
are considered to have been made for an adequate and full considera-
tion in money or money's worth.69
The Supreme Court has held that donative intent on the part of the
transferor is not required for a transfer to be subject to the gift tax.70
The tax is applied on the basis of "the objective facts of the transfer
and the circumstances under which it is made, rather than on the sub-
jective motives of the donor."71 Donative intent, however, may be
considered in determining whether a transfer subject to the gift tax
was made.72
The gift tax does not apply to transfers in satisfaction of an individ-
ual's obligation of support.7 3 The exclusion of such transfers is not
provided in the Internal Revenue Code but has been acknowledged by
Congress and the Supreme Court.74 The rationale for the exclusion is
a matter of debate.75 It has been suggested that the exclusion is al-
lowed on the grounds that satisfying a support obligation is the
equivalent of consumption by the transferor,76 that discharge of a
legal obligation is consideration for the transfer,77 and that such trans-
67. I.R.C. § 2512(b); see H.R. REP. No. 708, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1932), reprinted in
1939-1 C.B. (Part 2) 457, 477-78; S. REP. No. 665, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1932), re-
printed in 1939-1 C.B. (Part 2) 496, 525.
68. See PEAT & WILLBANKs, supra note 1, § 4.03, at 36.
69. Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-8 (1958).
70. Commissioner v. Wemyss, 324 U.S. 303, 306 (1945); see also Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-
1(g)(1)(as amended in 1986).
71. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(g)(1)(as amended in 1986).
72. Heyen v. United States, 945 F.2d 359, 362 (10th Cir. 1991).
73. PEAT & WILLBANIs, supra note 1, § 4.04, at 37; see generally Jean T. Adams, Rec-
onciling Family Law with Tax Policy: Untangling the Tax Treatment of Parental
Trusts, 46 TAX L. REv. 107 (1990); David Beck & Sheldon V. Ekman, Where Does
Support End and Taxable Gift Begin?, 23 INST. ON FED. TAx'N 1181 (1965); Milton
L. Ray, The Transfer-for-Consumption Problem- Support and the Gift Tax, 59 OR.
L. REV. 425 (1981). A basis for the obligation of support is said to lie in the public
policy consideration of avoiding the necessity of state support of family members.
Beck & Ekman, supra, at 1182.
74. Dickman v. Commissioner, 465 U.S. 330, 341 (1984)("Our laws require parents to
provide their minor offspring with the necessities and conveniences of life; ques-
tions under the [gift] tax law often arise, however, when parents provide more
than the necessities, and in quantities significant enough to attract the attention
of the taxing authorities."); H.R. REP. No. 97-201, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981),
reprinted in 1981-2 C.B. 352, 393 ("ITihe committee does not intend to change the
law that there is no gift if the person paving [sic] the medical expenses or tuition
is under an obligation under local law to provide such items to the recipient.").
75. See Harry L. Gutman, Reforming Federal Wealth Transfer Taxes After ERTA, 69
VA. L. REV. 1183, 1241 n.168 (1983).
76. PEAT & WILLBANKS, supra note 1, § 4.04, at 37.
77. Adams, supra note 73, at 123 n.64.
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fers might be exempt from taxation as "involuntary" transfers re-
quired by law.78
Most amounts expended on behalf of persons owed support will
not be subject to the gift tax because of the support obligation. But
not all expenditures for such persons escape taxation.79 The extent of
a person's support obligation is a matter of local law.8 0 In most states
the extent of the obligation is uncertainl and may vary depending on
the obligor's "earning ability, means, situation and condition in life."s2
Even if the extent of the obligation is determinable under local law, a
question remains whether the existence and extent of the obligation is
determined by local or federal law for federal gift tax purposes.8 3
The support obligation includes the necessaries of life (food, cloth-
ing, and shelter),8 4 but may include much more than necessaries.85 In-
deed, if the exclusion were limited to the bare necessaries of life, many
expenditures within the family context would constitute gifts because
78. Id.
79. A. James Casner, Proposed Tax Changes and Their Effect on Estate Planning, 3
INST. ON EST. PLAN 9-1, 9-3 (1969)("The only expenditure for a child that is not a
gift is one that relates to that which a parent is legally obligated to provide."); see
Converse v. Commissioner, 5 T.C. 1014, 1016 (1945), qffd 163 F.2d 131 (2d Cir.
1947)("The petitioner [taxpayer] may have done more for his infant daughter
than the minimum required by the law. We are unable to find from the evidence
that the Commissioner erred in holding that the petitioner made a gift to the
trust in the amount determined by him.").
80. Beck & Ekman, supra note 73, at 1184; Sue A. Wyskiver, Note, The Federal In-
come Tax Consequences of the Legal Obligation of Parents to Support Children,
47 OHIo ST. L.J. 753, 759 (1986).
81. Casner, supra note 79, at 9-3; Wyskiver, supra note 80, at 759.
82. Beck & Ekman, supra note 73, at 1184; see also, Wyskiver, supra note 80, at 760-
61.
83. See Beck & Ekman, supra note 73, at 1195; Ray, supra note 73, at 429-33; but see
H.R. REP. No. 97-201, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981), reprinted in 1981-2 C.B. 352, 393
("[Tihe committee does not intend to change the law that there is no gift if the
person paving [sic] the medical expenses or tuition is under an obligation under
local law to provide such items to the recipient.")(emphasis added).
84. Beck & Ekman, supra note 73, at 1184-85; Wyskiver, supra note 80, at 760.
85. Beck & Ekman, supra note 73, at 1198; Boris I. Bittker, The $10,000 Annual Per-
Donee Gift Tax Exclusion, 44 OHio ST. L.J. 447,448 (1983)("[T]he parental obliga-
tion to support minor children may encompass, under local law, a duty to recog-
nize ceremonial occasions, such as birthdays, with appropriate items."); Wyskiver,
supra note 80, at 760. Allan J. Parker, in How to Avoid Fraud Penalties in Estate
Planning, 7 INsT. ON EsT. PLAN 13-1 (1973), recognized the problems this
presents:
One of the difficulties... is to distinguish between what is a gift by a
father to a minor child and what is simply in discharge of the father's
legal obligation of support. That is, it might be a taxable gift to give an
adult or even a minor daughter a $3,000 bracelet; it certainly would not
be a taxable gift for a father to give a minor daughter a bicycle or a new
winter jacket, whether on the occasion of her birthday or not.
Id. at 13-3.
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they exceed the amount the obligor could be required to pay.8 6 But
exacting a gift tax from "parents who choose to go a step beyond their
legal duty in providing amenities and opportunities for their minor
children would never pass muster as a matter of either policy or
politics."87
In 1981, Congress removed certain payments that have a support
flavor from the reach of the gift tax by enacting I.R.C. § 2503(e).8 Di-
rect payments of tuition8 9 to educational organizations and of medical
expenses to medical care providers no longer constitute transfers for
gift tax purposes. 90 The exclusion was enacted out of Congressional
concern that certain payments of tuition on behalf of children who
had attained the age of majority and of medical expenses on behalf of
elderly relatives were subject to the gift tax under prior law.91 The
exclusion, however, does not require that any relationship exist be-
tween the transferor and the beneficiary of the payments and is un-
limited in amount. Removal of these transfers from the reach of the
gift tax increased the value of the annual exclusion for taxpayers who
previously had used that exclusion to shelter such payments from
taxation.
II. THE ANNUAL EXCLUSION
A. Reasons for the Exclusion
The House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance
Committee gave the following reasons for the annual exclusion in
1932:
Such exemption [the annual exclusion], on the one hand, is to obviate the ne-
cessity of keeping an account of and reporting numerous small gifts, and, on
86. Cf. Converse v. Commissioner, 5 T.C. 1014, 1016 (1945), affd 163 F.2d 131 (2d Cir.
1947); Casner, supra note 79, at 9-3.
87. Adams, supra note 73, at 124 (footnote omitted).
88. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 441(b), 95 Stat. 172, 319-
20. LR.C. § 2503(e) currently provides:
Exclusion for certain transfers for educational expenses or medical expenses.
(1) In general-Any qualified transfer shall not be treated as a transfer
of property by gift for purposes of this chapter.
(2) Qualified transfer-For purposes of this subsection, the term "quali-
fied transfer" means any amount paid on behalf of an individual -
(A) as tuition to an educational organization described in section
170(b)(1)(A)(ii) for the education or training of such individual, or
(B) to any person who provides medical care (as defined in section
213(d)) with respect to such individual as payment for such medical care.
89. I.R.C. § 2503(e)(2)(A). It has been suggested that it might be wise to expand the
exclusion to include all educational expenses (fees, room, and board). Joseph M.
Dodge, Redoing the Estate and Gift Taxes Along Easy-to-Value Lines, 43 TAx L.
REV. 241, 344 (1988).
90. I.R.C. § 2503(e).
91. H.R. REP. No. 97-201, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981), reprinted in 1981-2 C.B. 352,
393.
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the other, to fix the amount sufficiently large to cover in most cases wedding
and Christmas gifts and occasional gifts of relatively small amounts.9 2
Forty-four years later the House Ways and Means Committee sug-
gested that the annual exclusion also was intended to serve as an in-
centive for making lifetime transfers.93
Although the first reason given for the annual exclusion suggests
that gifts of small amounts need never be documented or reported,
that is not the case. If the combined value of all gifts made to a donee
during a calendar year exceeds the annual exclusion amount, all gifts
to that donee must be reported.94 The first $10,000 of gifts that qualify
for the annual exclusion is excluded in determining the donor's taxa-
ble gifts.95 Gifts of future interests in property do not qualify for the
annual exclusion96 and must always be documented and reported re-
gardless of amount.97 Even if a taxpayer concludes that a gift tax re-
turn is not required, possible valuation issues suggest it may be
prudent to document gifts below the annual exclusion amount.98 The
first reason given for the exclusion, therefore, does not justify the ex-
clusion when taxpayers most likely to fully utilize it or make gifts in
excess of the exclusion amount are considered.
The second reason given for the annual exclusion is its true justifi-
92. H.R. REP. No. 708, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1932), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. (Part 2)
457,478; S. REP. No. 665, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1932), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. (Part
2) 496, 525-26.
93. H.R. REP. No. 94-1380, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), reprinted in 1976-3 C.B. 735,
746.
94. I.R.S. Instructions for Form 709 (Revised November 1991), United States Gift
(and Generation Skipping Transfer) Tax Return, provide at page 4 that "[i]f the
total gifts of present interests to any donee are more than $10,000 in the calendar
year, then you must enter all such gifts that you made during the year to or on
behalf of that donee."
95. I.R.C. § 2503(a),(b).
96. I.R.C. § 2503(b).
97. See I.R.C. § 6019.
98. The statute of limitations for assessment and collection of the gift tax does not
begin to run until a gift tax return is filed. See I.R.C. § 6501. Even if a gift tax
return is filed and the statute of limitations has expired as to the year for which
the return was filed, the Internal Revenue Service is not precluded from revalu-
ing the gift for purposes of determining the value of taxable gifts for preceding
calendar years (in the computation of tax for gifts in subsequent years) unless a
gift tax was assessed or paid for the prior period. I.R.C. § 2504(c). Moreover, even
if the I.R.S. is precluded by § 2504(c) from revaluing gifts for gift tax purposes,
that section does not prevent the I.R.S. from revaluing gifts when calculating ad-
justed taxable gifts for estate tax purposes under I.R.C. § 2001(b)(1)(B). Stalcup
v. United States, 792 F. Supp. 714 (W.D. Okla. 1991); Estate of Smith v. Commis-
sioner, 94 T.C. 872 (1990), acq. 1990-2 C.B. 1; contra Boatmen's First Nat. Bank of
Kansas City v. United States, 705 F. Supp. 1407 (W.D. Mo. 1988); see Paul L.
Caron, Revaluation of Prior Gifts for Estate Tax Purposes After Expiration of
Statute of Limitations for Year of Gift, 67 TAxES 286 (1989) (arguing that once the
statute of limitations expires for gift tax purposes the I.R.S. lacks authority to
revalue gifts for estate tax purposes).
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
cation. Customary and occasional gifts of relatively small value should
be allowed without triggering the gift tax. A tax system that exacted a
tax upon the occasional transfer of property of modest value would be
extremely unpopular and unwise from a policy perspective. Noncom-
pliance would be widespread, and, unless the rate of taxation were
high, enforcement efforts would not be justified by revenue that
would be collected. Disrespect for the entire tax system would result,
seriously undermining the voluntary compliance tax system.
If the third reason suggested for the annual exclusion is "taken
seriously, it would raise the interesting question of why lifetime giving
should be encouraged at the cost of transfer tax base erosion." 99 Com-
peting considerations exist in the answer to that question:
The argument for encouraging lifetime gifts is that such transfers pass new
wealth to the next generation, thus avoiding "locking in" of investments and
promoting the employment of capital in riskier ventures, but there is really no
empirical data to support this conclusion. Even if we accept it as true, we
must ask whether the benefit outweighs the cost of a high level of annual
exclusion and the unfairness inherent in allowing wealthy taxpayers yet one
more benefit that is not realistically available to all taxpayers.1 0 0
The more than threefold increase in the unified credit since 1981 (al-
lowing the transfer of $600,000 of property free of gift tax) and the tax-
exclusive nature of the gift tax suggest that the exclusion cannot be
justified as a necessary incentive for lifetime gifting.101
The annual exclusion continues to be justified on the ground that
taxpayers should be allowed to make customary and occasional gifts of
relatively small value without precipitating the gift tax. The amount
of the annual exclusion and the type of interest that qualifies for the
exclusion are important to accomplishing the exclusion's limited pur-
pose. If the exclusion amount is too low, gifts of relatively small value
will not be exempted and the exclusion will not accomplish its pur-
pose. If the exclusion amount is too high, gifts will be encouraged as a
means to avoid the estate tax and the estate tax protective function of
the gift tax will be impaired. If the exclusion is not limited to the
transfer of interests that possess the characteristics of customary and
occasional gifts, it will be used as an estate tax avoidance device.
B. Annual Exclusion Amount
The annual exclusion was set at $5,000 when enacted in 1932.102 In
1938, the House Ways and Means Committee, which had recom-
mended a $3,000 exclusion in 1932,103 considered the $5,000 exclusion
to be unreasonably large and recommended reduction to $3,000 "[i]n
99. Gutman, supra note 75, at 1244 n.175.
100. PEAT & WILLBANKS, supra note 1, § 7.06, at 94.
101. Id.
102. Revenue Act of 1932, Pub. L. No. 72-154, § 504(b), 47 Stat. 169, 247.
103. H.R. REP. No. 708, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1932), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. (Part 2)
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view of the frequency with which donors are induced by the exemp-
tion to build up estates of considerable size for the members of their
families ......-104 The Senate, however, agreed only to a reduction to
$4,000105 for calendar years beginning with 1939.106
The House Committee again proposed reduction of the annual ex-
clusion to $3,000 in 1942 out of concern that the exclusion impaired the
estate tax protective function of the gift tax:
Since this is an annual exclusion (not exhaustible as is the specific exemption)
and is not limited to any number of donees, it is possible to distribute property
of large aggregate value over a period of years, free not only of gift tax but of
estate tax as well. While administrative difficulties prevent the abolition of
the exclusion, your committee recommend[s] that it be reduced to $3,000.107
The Senate agreed and the reduction was made in the Revenue Act of
1942108.
The annual exclusion amount remained unchanged for the next
thirty-nine years. In 1981, in recognition of the reduced value of the
exclusion as a result of inflation,o 9 the annual exclusion was in-
creased to $10,000.110
C. Future Interest Limitation
Because the gift tax serves an estate tax protective function and
the annual exclusion provides a limited exemption from the gift tax,
the type of interest that qualifies for the exclusion is important in or-
der that the exclusion serve its limited purpose. If all interests quali-
fied for the exclusion, it would afford a gaping loophole through which
substantial amounts could be routinely transferred in avoidance of the
estate tax while denying the donee current benefits characteristic of
customary and occasional gifts.
Congress recognized the need to limit the annual exclusion to a
certain type of interest by allowing the exclusion only for gifts of pres-
ent interests; in the words of the statute, only "[i]n the case of gifts
(other than gifts of future interests in property)." 1 ' Gifts of future
457,478; S. REP. No. 665, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1932), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. (Part
2) 496, 525.
104. H.R. REP. NO. 1860, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. (Part 2)
728, 772.
105. Revenue Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-554, § 505(a), 52 Stat. 447, 565; see H.R. REP.
No. 2330, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. (Part 2) 817, 830
(conference agreement reduced exclusion to $4,000).
106. Revenue Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-554, § 505(b), 52 Stat. 447, 565.
107. H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1942), reprinted in 1942-2 C.B. 372, 403.
108. Revenue Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-753, § 454, 56 Stat. 798, 953.
109. H.R. REP. No. 97-201, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981), reprinted in 1981-2 C.B. 352,
393; S. REP. No. 97-144, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981), reprinted in 1981-2 C.B. 412,
462.
110. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 441(a), 95 Stat. 172, 319.
111. I.R.C. § 2503(b).
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interests always constitute taxable gifts regardless of amount.112
The House and Senate committee reports suggest the reasons for
the future interest limitation:
The exemption does not apply with respect to a gift to any donee to whom is
given a future interest. The term "future interests in property" refers to any
interest or estate, whether vested or contingent, limited to commence in pos-
session or enjoyment at a future date. The exemption being available only in
so far as the donees are ascertainable, the denial of the exemption in the case
of gifts of future interests is dictated by the apprehended difficulty, in many
instances, of determining the number of eventual donees and the value of
their respective gifts. 13
Although the meanings of "future interest" and "present interest"
are critical to application of the annual exclusion, Congress did not
define those terms in the Internal Revenue Code. Current Treasury
Regulations, adapted largely from Congressional committee reports,
provide guidance as to the meanings of "future interest" and "present
interest":
"Future interest" is a legal term, and includes reversions, remainders, and
other interests or estates, whether vested or contingent, and whether or not
supported by a particular interest or estate, which are limited to commence in
use, possession, or enjoyment at some future date or time.... An unrestricted
right to the immediate use, possession, or enjoyment of property or the in-
come from property (such as a life estate or term certain) is a present interest
in property.1 14
In United States v. Pelzer,115 the Supreme Court rejected the argu-
ment that state law was determinative of what constituted a future
interest for purposes of the annual exclusion and emphasized the rev-
enue protective function of the limitation:
In the absence of any statutory definition of the phrase [future interests] we
look to the purpose of the statute to ascertain what is intended. It plainly is
not concerned with the varying local definitions of property interests or with
the local refinements of conveyancing, and there is no reason for supposing
that the extent of the granted tax exemption was intended to be given a corre-
sponding variation. Its purpose was rather the protection of the revenue and
the appropriate administration of the tax immunity provided by the statute. It
is this purpose which marks the boundaries of the statutory command.1 1 6
The interests at issue in Pelzer were future interests because the do-
nee received no current benefit.l'T
112. See I.R.C. § 2503(a), (b).
113. H.R. REP. No. 708, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1932), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. (Part 2)
457, 478; S. REP. No. 665, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1932), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. (Part
2) 496, 526.
114. Treas. Reg. § 25.2503-3(a),(b)(as amended in 1983).
115. 312 U.S. 399 (1941).
116. Id. at 403.
117. IcL at 404. The Court explained:
Here the beneficiaries had no right to the present enjoyment of the
corpus or of the income and unless they survive the ten-year period they
will never receive any part of either. The "use, possession, or enjoy-
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In Fondren v. Commissioner"18 the Supreme Court held that de-
termination of whether an interest qualifies for the annual exclusion
turns on whether the interests of the beneficiaries are limited to com-
mence in use, possession, or enjoyment in the future:
[I]t is not enough to bring the [annual] exclusion into force that the donee has
vested rights. In addition he must have the right presently to use, possess or
enjoy the property. These terms are not words of art, like "fee" in the law of
seizin,. . . but connote the right to substantial present economic benefit. The
question is of time, not when title vests, but when enjoyment begins.
Whatever puts the barrier of a substantial period between the will of the bene-
ficiary or donee now to enjoy what has been given him and that enjoyment
makes the gift one of a future interest within the meaning of the
regulation.119
The Court denied the exclusion for the interests at issue in Fondren
because the donees' rights were subject to a contingency of need that
might never arise. 2 0
A corollary to the Supreme Court's holding in Fondren that vest-
ing of title is not determinative is that the mere power of the donee to
dispose of the gift for value will not convert a future interest into a
present interest.1 2 1 On the other hand, the inability of the donee to
dispose of a gift as a result of restrictive agreements may be sufficient
to result in denial of the exclusion for an outright gift.122
Notwithstanding these decisions, it has been suggested that the
Congressional committees' reports support the proposition that the
purpose of the future interest limitation is to ensure that the identity
ment" of each donee is thus postponed to the happening of a future un-
certain event. The gift thus involved the difficulties of determining the
"number of eventual donees and the value of their respective gifts"
which it was the purpose of the statute to avoid.
318. 324 U.S. 18 (1945).
119. Id. at 20-21 (citation omitted).
120. Id. at 24.
121. Blasdel v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 1014, 1021-22 (1972), affd per curiam, 478 F.2d
226, 227 (5th Cir. 1973); Chanin v. United States, 393 F.2d 972, 977 (Ct. Cl. 1968);
Hay v. Commissioner, 47 B.T.A. 247, 255 (1942); Rev. Rul. 76-360, 1976-2 C.B. 298,
298. In Chanin the Court of Claims explained:
If plaintiffs' position were accepted, donee exclusions would be allowed
in every case in which the donee received a future interest in property,
which was marketable, thus doing violence to the well recognized statu-
tory purpose of the present statute .... Almost every "future interest" in
property, if not subject to restrictions on alienation, confers some pres-
ent benefit by virtue of the fact that the donee could dispose of it imme-
diately. Of course, the marketability of a "future interest" may not be as
great as that of a fee title to property, ... but it cannot be doubted that
the donee has the right to dispose of his "future interest." Such a re-
mainderman-donee has a future interest within the meaning of the perti-
nent statute, even though his interest be unqualifiedly vested at the time
of the gift ... and even though he has an immediate right to sell, devise,
or otherwise dispose of his future interest.
Id- at 977 (citations omitted).
122. Rev. Rul. 76-360, 1976-2 C.B. 298.
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of the donees and the amount of their respective gifts can be deter-
mined and that the donees need not have a right to immediate use,
enjoyment, or possession of the property.1 23 If that were the case, a
transfer in trust for a single beneficiary would qualify for the exclu-
sion even though the beneficiary would not be entitled to trust income
or principal for a period of years.124 That argument, however, has
been repeatedly rejected by the courts.'25 The mere fact that enjoy-
ment is postponed is enough to make the gift one of a future
interest.126
In determining whether an interest is a present interest or a future
interest, it is the interest that the donee receives that must be ex-
amined.127 The nature of the interest of the donee,128 as well as its
value,129 is to be determined as of the date of the gift.
Almost all outright transfers of interests in property qualify for
the annual exclusion. Even transfers of certain interests that appear
to postpone use or enjoyment qualify for the exclusion. The outright
transfer of "contractual rights as exist in a bond, note (though bearing
no interest until maturity), or in a policy of life insurance, the obliga-
tions of which are to be discharged by payments in the future" is not
the transfer of a future interest. 3 0 Allowing the exclusion for such
123. Robert A. Layden, Note, Gift Tax: The Annual Exclusion and Future Interests, 27
NoTRE DAME L. REV. 97, 112 (1951)("[T]here is no hint of a legislative desire to
penalize gifts simply because enjoyment is postponed."); Richard S. Rothberg,
Crummey Powers Enhance the Usefulness of Trusts for Minors and Life Insur-
ance Trusts, 17 TAx'N FOR LAw. 132, 132 (1988)(suggesting that, if the present
interest requirement was merely to assure that the donee is ascertainable and not
to assure the donee immediate access to the gift, estate planners "can use their
ingenuity in good conscience, secure in the knowledge that no violence is done to
the Congressional purpose by keeping the donees separate from their money, so
long as one can figure out who the donees are.").
124. See Layden, supra note 123, at 98 (suggesting that for every transfer there must
be at least one donee for whom the donor should be able to claim the exclusion).
125. See, e.g., Fondren v. Commissioner, 324 U.S. 18, 26 (1945); Commissioner v. Glos,
123 F. 2d 548, 550 (7th Cir. 1941); Welch v. Paine, 120 F.2d 141, 142 (1st Cir. 1941);
Chanin v. United States, 393 F.2d 972, 977-78 (Ct. Cl. 1968).
126. See Commissioner v. Disston, 325 U.S. 442, 446 (1945); Fondren v. Commissioner,
324 U.S. 18, 20 (1945).
127. Wisotzkey v. Commissioner, 144 F.2d 632, 636 (3d Cir. 1944); Blasdel v. Commis-
sioner, 58 T.C. 1014, 1018 (1972), affd per curiam, 478 F.2d 226 (5th Cir. 1973);
Rev. Rul. 79-280, 1979-2 C.B. 340, 341.
128. Commissioner v. Brandegee, 123 F.2d 58, 61 (1st Cir. 1941).
129. Van Den Wymelenberg v. United States, 397 F.2d 443, 445 (7th Cir. 1968), cerL
denied, 393 U.S. 953 (1968); Kniep v. Commissioner, 172 F.2d 755, 757 (8th Cir.
1949).
130. Treas. Reg. § 25.2503-3(a)(as amended in 1983); see Rev. Rul. 55-408, 1955-1 C.B.
113, 114 (transfer of a life insurance policy that had no cash surrender value, but
granted the donee the usual incidents of ownership, constituted the transfer of a
present interest, where the donee was not restricted from exercising the legal
incidents of ownership by prior endorsement or otherwise).
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interests has been justified on the grounds that the donee enjoys the
property to the same extent as did the donor,131 that it is not the donor
but the assets themselves that cause deferral,132 and that the donee
receives possession of the property.1 33
The annual exclusion is available for direct transfers of present in-
terests in property to donees.134 This is the rule even if the donee is a
minor,1 35 because the statute "make[s] no distinction between gifts to
minors and gifts to adults." 3 6 The exclusion also applies if the direct
transfer is to the guardian of a minor or to a trustee who is required to
hold the property as if it were the guardian of the minor.137
Gifts in trust,1 38 however, do not necessarily result in allowance of
the annual exclusion. 3 9 A gift in trust may result in the transfer of
many equitable interests to many beneficiaries. Because of the many
ways in which gifts may be made in trust, no simple rule exists for
determining whether such a gift is of a present or future interest.140
The trust provisions and surrounding circumstances must be ex-
amined to determine qualification for the annual exclusion.141
Transfers in trust initially raised the question of whether the do-
nee for annual exclusion purposes was the trust or the trust benefi-
ciaries. The Board of Tax Appeals and several circuit courts held that
the trust was the donee.142 Congress, concerned that multiple trusts
for the same donee might be used to avoid the per-donee limitation of
the exclusion,143 responded by denying the exclusion for all gifts in
131. Sherman, supra note 10, at 608.
132. PEAT & WILBANKS, supra note 1, § 7.03, at 77.
133. Id. § 7.03, at 80-81.
134. Helvering v. Hutchings, 312 U.S. 393, 395 (1941)("It is not doubted that separate
gifts, other than gifts of future interests, made directly to the donees without the
intervention of a trustee entitle the donor under § 504(b) to one $5,000 [annual]
exclusion for each gift.").
135. Daniels v. Commissioner, 10 T.C.M. (CCH) 147, 150 (1951); Rev. Rul. 54-400,1954-
2 C.B. 319 ("An unqualified and unrestricted gift to a minor, with or without the
appointment of a legal guardian, is a gift of a present interest .....
136. Fondren v. Commissioner, 324 U.S. 18, 28 (1945).
137. See United States v. Baker, 236 F.2d 317, 320 (4th Cir. 1956); Rev. Rul. 59-78, 1959-
1 C.B. 690, 691.
138. Donors may have tax as well as non-tax reasons for making gifts in trust rather
than outright. See Stephan R. Leimberg, Section 2503(b) - Use of Trusts and the
Gift Tax Exclusion, 38 INST. ON FED. TAx'N 42-1, 42-7 to 42-8 (1980)(identifying
many of the reasons for transfers in trust).
139. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Disston, 325 U.S. 442 (1945); Fondren v. Commissioner,
324 U.S. 18 (1945).
140. Commissioner v. Kempner, 126 F.2d 853, 854 (5th Cir. 1942).
141. Fondren v. Commissioner, 324 U.S. 18, 24 (1945); Commissioner v. Kempner, 126
F.2d 853, 854 (5th Cir. 1942).
142. Commissioner v. Krebs, 90 F.2d 880, 881 (3d Cir. 1937); Commissioner v. Wells, 88
F.2d 339, 341 (7th Cir. 1937) affing 34 B.T.A. 315 (1936).
143. S. REP. No. 1567, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. (Part 2) 779,
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trust beginning in 1939.144 Three years later, the Supreme Court held
in Helvering v. Hutchings14S that the number of annual exclusions for
transfers in trust is determined by the number of trust beneficiaries
receiving gifts of present interests and not at the trust level.146 In 1942
Congress removed the restriction it had imposed for gifts in trust 147 in
response to Hutchings.14s
Transfers in trust for the benefit of minors have presented particu-
lar problems in connection with the annual exclusion.149 Few donors
are willing to convey property directly to minors because of their in-
ability to manage property and reservations concerning the minor's
judgment upon attaining majority. These concerns often led to trans-
fers in trust that failed to qualify for the annual exclusion because of
the future interest limitation.150
In 1954, Congress responded to taxpayers' desires to make gifts in
trust for minors that would qualify for the annual exclusion without
creating a present interest1 5 ' by enacting I.R.C. § 2503(c).35 2 The pro-
vision was a response to the uncertainty that existed with regard to
the annual exclusion and gifts in trust for minors.1 53 Section 2503(c)
144. Revenue Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-554, § 505, 52 Stat. 447, 565.
145. 312 U.S. 393 (1941).
146. Id. at 398; accord, Ryerson v. United States, 312 U.S. 405, 408 (1941); United States
v. Pelzer, 312 U.S. 399, 401-02 (1941).
147. Revenue Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-753, § 454, 56 Stat. 798, 953.
148. S. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942), reprinted in 1942-2 C.B. 504, 682.
149. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Disston, 325 U.S. 442 (1945); Fondren v. Commissioner,
324 U.S. 18 (1945); Crummey v. Commissioner, 397 F.2d 82 (9th Cir. 1968); Stifel v.
Commissioner, 197 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1952); Kieckhefer v. Commissioner, 189 F.2d.
118 (7th Cir. 1951).
150. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Disston, 325 U.S. 442 (1945); Fondren v. Commissioner,
324 U.S. 18 (1945); Stifel v. Commissioner, 197 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1952).
151. See Norman A. Sugarman & Robert M. Brucken, The Present Interest Trust for a
Minor, 4 REAL PRop. PROB. & TR. J. 651, 653-54 (1969).
152. Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-591, § 2503(c), 68A Stat. 1, 405.
Section 2503(c) currently provides:
(c) Transfer For The Benefit Of Minor. - No part of a gift to an individ-
ual who has not attained the age of 21 years on the date of the transfer
shall be considered a gift of a future interest in property for purposes of
subsection (b) if the property and the income therefrom -
(1) may be expended by, or for the benefit of, the donee before his
attaining the age of 21 years, and
(2) will to the extent not so expended -
(A) pass to the donee on his attaining the age of 21 years, and
(B) in the event the donee dies before attaining the age of 21
years, be payable to the estate of the donee or as he may ap-
point under a general power of appointment as defined in
section 2514(c).
153. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4025, 4120; S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954), reprinted in 1954
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4621, 4760.
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provides an exception to the present interest requirement. 5 4 The ex-
ception, however, is available only if three requirements are satisfied.
First, the property and its income must be capable of being expended
by or for the benefit of the minor during minority. 5 5 Second, the
property and its income must pass to the donee at age twenty-one. 5 6
Third, the property and its income must be payable to the minor's es-
tate, or as he appoints pursuant to a general power of appointment, if
the minor dies before age twenty-one. 5 7 These requirements meant
that § 2503(c) was an imperfect solution in the eyes of many taxpay-
ers,158 and the search for additional ways to obtain the annual exclu-
sion for transfers in trust for minors continued. 5 9
D. Burden of Proof
The taxpayer has the burden of proving that he is entitled to the
annual exclusion.160 The burden requires that the taxpayer prove the
gift is of a present interest16' and the amount of the exclusion to
which he is entitled. 6 2 This burden is consistent with the rule that
Internal Revenue Service deficiency determinations are presumed to
be correct and taxpayers have the burden of proving them to be
154. Sugarman & Brucken, supra note 151, at 652.
155. I.R.C. § 2503(c)(1).
156. I.R.C. § 2503(c)(2)(A).
157. I.R.C. § 2503(c)(2)(B).
158. See Polisher, Estate and Gift Tax Changes Made by the 1954 Revenue Code, 59
DIcK. L. REv. 1, 15 (1954)("One must carefully consider, in the effort to utilize
the annual exclusion, whether the cure might not be worse than the disease, in
that a substantial sum of money may be paid over to the donee at an early age,
when he is immature and ill-equipped to handle it.").
159. In Tech. Adv. Mem. 87-27-7003 (Mar. 16, 1987), the I.R.S. acknowledged the im-
pact of the restrictions:
Although the enactment of section 2503(c) in 1954 provided some relief,
it was restricted in application. Hence, the continued tendency of estate
planners to give minor beneficiaries an overriding right to demand the
trust property outright, a right which became refined, with judicial ap-
proval, to a right limited in time.
Id. (citation omitted).
160. Commissioner v. Disston, 325 U.S. 442, 449 (1945); Maryland National Bank v.
United States, 609 F.2d 1078, 1080 (4th Cir. 1979); Kniep v. Commissioner, 172
F.2d 755, 758 (8th Cir. 1949); Commissioner v. Brandegee, 123 F.2d 58, 62 (1st Cir.
1941); Rev. Rul. 79-280, 1975-2 C.B. 340, 341.
161. Commissioner v. Disston, 325 U.S. 442, 449 (1945); Kniep v. Commissioner, 172
F.2d 775, 758 (8th Cir. 1949); Commissioner v. Brandegee, 123 F.2d 58, 62 (1st Cir.
1941); Rev. Rul. 79-280, 1975-2 C.B. 340, 341; see also Maryland National Bank v.
United States, 609 F.2d 1078, 1080 (4th Cir. 1979).
162. Commissioner v. Disston, 325 U.S. 442, 449 (1945); Maryland National Bank v.
United States, 609 F.2d 1078, 1080 (4th Cir. 1979); Kniep v. Commissioner, 172
F.2d 775, 758 (8th Cir. 1949).
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wrong.163
The burden of proof is extremely important in annual exclusion
cases. In recent years the Internal Revenue Service has argued that
the annual exclusion should be denied on the basis that the donor did
not intend to grant the donee a present interest,164 that the transfer
was illusory,165 and that the transfer to one person was in substance
an indirect transfer to another. 6 6 These arguments arise most often
in connection with transfers in trust subject to lapsing demand
powers. 167
These arguments invoke the substance over form doctrine 68 and
require a facts and circumstances determination based upon the trust
instrument and surrounding circumstances. 16 9 The substance over
form doctrine applies to gift and estate taxes as well as income tax.17 0
The doctrine is grounded in common sense; taxation depends not on
the form chosen by the taxpayer but on the substance of the transac-
tion.171 Transactions that take place among family members and cre-
ate tax benefits are to be carefully scrutinizedl 72 "in order to
determine if they are in economic reality what they appear to be on
their face."'173
The question in cases in which the substance over form doctrine
arises is often whether there was an agreement or understanding be-
tween the donor and the donee that the donee would act in a certain
163. Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933); Muserlian v. Commissioner, 932 F.2d
109, 112 (2d Cir. 1991); Bernuth v. Commissioner, 470 F.2d 710, 714 (2d Cir. 1972).
164. E.g., Estate of Cristofani v. Commissioner, 97 T.C. 74, 83 (1991), acq. in result,
1992-1 C.B. 1, action on decision, 1992-09 (Mar. 23, 1992); Rev. Rul. 81-7, 1981-1
C.B 474; Rev. Rul. 85-24, 1985-1 C.B. 329, 330; Tech. Adv. Mem. 90-45-002 (July 27,
1990); Tech. Adv. Mem. 87-27-003 (Mar. 16, 1987).
165. E.g., Estate of Cristofani v. Commissioner, 97 T.C. 74, 83 (1991), acq. in result,
1992-1 C.B. 1, action on decision, 1992-09 (Mar. 23, 1992); Rev. Rul. 81-7, 1981-1
C.B 474; Rev. Rul. 85-24, 1985-1 C.B. 329, 330.
166. E.g., Heyen v. United States, 945 F.2d 359, 363 (10th Cir. 1991); Rev. Rul. 85-24,
1985-1 C.B. 329, 330; Tech. Adv. Mem. 91-41-008 (June 24, 1991); Tech. Adv. Mem.
90-45-002 (July 27, 1990); Tech. Adv. Mem. 87-27-003 (Mar. 16, 1987).
167. E.g., Estate of Cristofani v. Commissioner, 97 T.C. 74, 83 (1991), acq. in result,
1992-1 C.B. 1, action on decision, 1992-09 (Mar. 23, 1992); Rev. Rul. 81-7, 1981-1
C.B 474; Rev. Rul. 85-24, 1985-1 C.B. 329, 330; Tech. Adv. Mem. 90-45-002 (July 27,
1990); Tech. Adv. Mem. 87-27-003 (Mar. 16, 1987).
168. See note 14 supra.
169. Fondren v. Commissioner, 324 U.S. 18, 24 (1945); Commissioner v. Kempner, 126
F.2d 853, 854 (5th Cir. 1942).
170. Heyen v. United States, 945 F.2d 359, 363 (10th Cir. 1991); see Chanin v. United
States, 393 F.2d 972, 978-79 (Ct. Cl. 1968); Estate of Maxwell v. Commissioner, 98
T.C. 594 (1992); Furst v. Commissioner, 21 T.C.M. (CCH) 1169, 1172-73 (1962).
171. See note 14 supra.
172. Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733, 746 (1949); Muserlian v. Commissioner,
932 F.2d 109, 112 (2d Cir. 1991); Estate of Reynolds v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 172,
201 (1970); Gibbon v. Commissioner, 19 T.C. 78, 84 (1952).
173. Gibbon v. Commissioner, 19 T.C. 78, 84 (1952).
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way.174 Must the Commissioner prove the existence of an agreement
or understanding, or must the taxpayer disprove its existence? In the
absence of proof, should the finder of fact be allowed to infer an agree-
ment or understanding where the facts and circumstances do not pass
a "smell test"? Common sense should not be disregarded in deciding
these questions; agreements are often unnecessary among family
members who are aware of the donor's purpose.175
In the estate tax area, similar burden of proof issues arise in the
application of § 2036(a)(1).1 76 If a parent transfers his residence to his
children, but continues sole occupancy of the property until death, the
issue is whether the parent retained possession or enjoyment of the
transferred property.177 If he did, the value of the property will be
included in the parent's gross estate for estate tax purposes.178 The
transfer of title is not conclusive; if it were, form would prevail over
substance and the estate tax could easily be avoided.179
Courts use the substance over form doctrine when applying
§ 2036(a)(1) to determine the estate tax result.s0 An express or im-
plied understanding between the parties that the parent will have use
of the property for life is sufficient under § 2036(a)(1).1s The Tax
174. E.g. Estate of Cristofani v. Commissioner, 97 T.C. 74, 83 (1991), acq. in result,
1992-1 C.B. 1, action on decision, 1992-09 (Mar. 23, 1992); Tech. Adv. Mem. 91-41-
008 (June 24, 1991); Tech. Adv. Mem. 90-45-002 (July 27, 1990); see Heyen v.
United States, 945 F.2d 359, 361 (10th Cir. 1991).
175. Kent Mason, An Analysis of Crummey and the Annual Exclusion, 65 MARQ. L.
REv. 573, 593 n.63 (1982); see also, Nicholas A.J. Vlietstra, Note, Estate of Cris-
tofani v. Commissioner: The Expanded Potential of Crummey Powers for Trans-
fer Tax Avoidance, 45 TAX LAw. 583, 590 (1992)("Especially in a situation where
the trustor has created a trust to benefit his family, the donee's understanding
that his benefactor intends the withdrawal powers to remain unused acts as the
functional equivalent of an agreement to limit present enjoyment.").
176. E.g., Estate of Maxwell v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 594 (1992); Estate of Rapelje v.
Commissioner, 73 T.C. 82, 86 (1979); Estate of Linderme v. Commissioner, 52 T.C.
305, 309 (1969).
177. Guynn v. United States, 437 F.2d 1148, 1150 (4th Cir. 1971); Estate of Maxwell v.
Commissioner, 98 T.C. 594 (1992); Estate of Rapeije v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 82,
85-86 (1979); Estate of Linderme v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 305, 307 (1969).
178. I.R.C. § 2036(a)(1); Guynn v. United States, 437 F.2d 1148, 1149 (4th Cir. 1971);
Estate of Maxwell v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 594 (1992); Estate of Rapeije v. Com-
missioner, 73 T.C. 82, 85-86 (1979); Estate of Linderme v. Commissioner, 52 T.C.
305, 307 (1969).
179. Guynn v. United States, 437 F.2d 1148, 1150 (4th Cir. 1971); Estate of Maxwell v.
Commissioner, 98 T.C. No. 39 (May 13, 1992); Estate of Rapeije v. Commissioner,
73 T.C. 82, 85-86 (1979); Estate of Linderme v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 305, 309
(1969).
180. Estate of Maxwell v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. No. 594 (1992); Estate of Rapeije v.
Commissioner, 73 T.C. 82, 85-86 (1979); Estate of Linderme v. Commissioner, 52
T.C. 305, 309 (1969).
181. Guynn v. United States, 437 F.2d 1148, 1150 (4th Cir. 1971); Estate of Maxwell v.
Commissioner, 98 T.C. 594 (1992); Estate of Rapeije v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 82,
86 (1979); Treas. Reg. § 20.2036-1(a)(as amended in 1960)("An interest or right is
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Court has held that the burden is on the taxpayer "to disprove the
existence of any implied agreement or understanding, and that burden
is particularly onerous when intrafamily arrangements are in-
volved."82 In determining whether there was an implied understand-
ing, courts consider all facts and circumstances surrounding the
transfer and subsequent use.1 8 3
Courts should take a similar approach in deciding annual exclusion
cases. Courts should use the substance over form doctrine cognizant
of the gift tax's estate tax protective purpose and of the limited ex-
emption intended by Congress when it enacted the annual exclusion.
The exclusion, as a matter of legislative grace, should be strictly con-
strued, and transactions among family members should be carefully
scrutinized. The Commissioner should not be required to prove the
existence of an agreement or understanding between the donor and
donee. The existence of an agreement or understanding should be in-
ferred where the facts and circumstances suggest the substance of the
transaction is not reflected in its form. The burden of proof should be
on the taxpayer to disprove the existence of an implied agreement or
understanding. If the courts approached annual exclusion cases from
this perspective, the limited exclusion intended by Congress would be
fully allowed and current abuses would be checked.
III. AVAILABILITY OF THE ANNUAL EXCLUSION FOR
CERTAIN TRANSFERS
A three-part test must be satisfied in order to obtain the annual
exclusion: First, the donee must receive the immediate use, enjoy-
ment, or possession of the property (a present interest in the prop-
erty).18 4 Second, the identity of the donee must be determinable.185
treated as having been retained or reserved if at the time of the transfer there
was an understanding, express, or implied, that the interest or right would later
be conferred."); Rev. Rul. 78-409, 1978-2 C.B. 234; Rev. Rul. 70-155, 1970-1 C.B.
189.
182. Estate of Rapelje v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 82, 86 (1979); see also Estate of Max-
well v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 594 (1992); Estate of Linderme v. Commissioner, 52
T.C. 305, 309 (1969); but see Mason, supra note 175, at 595 n.66 (suggesting that the
I.R.S. has the burden of proving the existence of an understanding).
183. Guynn v. United States, 437 F.2d 1148, 1150 (4th Cir. 1971); Estate of Maxwell v.
Commissioner, 98 T.C. 594 (1992); Estate of Rapelje v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 82,
86 (1979); Estate of Linderme v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 305, 307 (1969); Rev. Rul.
78-409, 1978-2 C.B. 234.
184. I.R.C. § 2503(b); Commissioner v. Disston, 325 U.S. 442, 445 (1945); Fondren v.
Commissioner, 324 U.S. 18, 20 (1945).
185. I.R.C. § 2503(b)(the exclusion is provided on a per-donee basis); Heyen v. United
States, 945 F.2d 359, 363 (10th Cir. 1991)("Actual donees of gift property must be
identified, despite the naming by a donor of a beneficiary." (citations omitted));
see also Bittker, supra note 85, at 449 (identifying one of the principal issues that
arise in connection with the annual exclusion as identification of the donee).
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Third, the value of the gift must be ascertainable at the time of the
gift.186 Common sense application of these requirements would limit
the exclusion to the narrow exemption intended by Congress and
needed to achieve the gift tax's estate tax protective purpose.
A. Income Interests
In Commissioner v. Brandegee,8 7 the First Circuit held that "the
gift of an immediate life interest in income is to be regarded as a pres-
ent interest" 8 8 for purposes of the annual exclusion. The court con-
cluded that in "ordinary usage" a life tenant under a trust, having the
right to the immediate enjoyment of the income, is considered to have
a present interest even though possession of the corpus is postponed or
withheld.189 A.Treasury Regulation in which the annual exclusion
amount was subtracted from the value of a life estate in reaching net
gifts was cited by the court; it found "by necessary implication" that a
mere life estate was a present interest.190 The court did not further
justify its holding.
Although the court in Brandegee held that an income interest was
a present interest, it noted that the ability of a trustee to make discre-
tionary distributions of income would not create a present interest.19'
The exclusion would be denied even though the trustee exercised its
discretion and distributed trust income.' 92 The nature of the donee's
interest is to be determined as of the date of the gift, not by what the
trustee subsequently does in the exercise of its discretion. 93 Denial of
the exclusion where the trustee has discretion over income distribu-
tions is required because neither the identity of the donee nor the
value of the interest transferred to any donee can be determined at
the time of the transfer.194
One year later a federal district court in Charles v. Hassett9 5 had
to determine whether the annual exclusion would be allowed for a
transfer under which a donee was entitled to trust income immedi-
186. Stark v. United States, 477 F.2d 131, 132 n.1 (8th Cir. 1973); Van Den Wymelen-
berg v. United States, 397 F.2d 443, 445 (7th Cir. 1968), cert denied, 393 U.S. 953
(1968); Kniep v. Commissioner, 172 F.2d 755, 757 (8th Cir. 1949); see also Sherman,
supra note 10, at 588-89 ("[1It is necessary to determine the value of what each
donee receives because the exclusion is limited to the lesser of $10,000 or the
value of what the donee receives." (footnote omitted)).
187. 123 F.2d 58 (1st Cir. 1941).
188. Id. at 62.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 61.
192. Id
193. Id.
194. See Helvering v. Blair, 121 F.2d 945, 947 (2d Cir. 1941).
195. 43 F. Supp. 432 (D. Mass. 1942).
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ately and to trust principal in equal one-third shares when he attained
the ages of twenty-five, thirty, and thirty-five.19 6 The court consid-
ered several possible solutions to the issues and discussed at length the
question of whether an income interest should be considered a present
interest:
The fourth solution, starting from the same premises, but putting more em-
phasis on the uncertainty, and especially the remoteness in time, which under-
lie the payments of both income and of corpus, regards both interests as
"future interests" and hence not excludible from the gift tax.
A priori, there is much to be said for the fourth view. Congress, though it
did not speak clearly, may have meant to exclude from the gift tax only those
gifts which the donee received and was free to dispose of during the taxable
year. This would allow for the customary anniversary, holiday and like gifts
without making it possible for the donor to escape taxation on the equivalent
of a testamentary trust. Moreover, it is startling to a layman to be told that for
tax purposes he has a "present interest" when all the gift is to be paid in the
future and is to be paid only if he lives. And his surprise is not lessened when,
as in the case at bar, he is told that although his interest has an appraised
value, it has no market value because the donor, by a spendthrift trust, has
made the gift unassignable and beyond the reach of creditors. 1 9 7
The court, nonetheless, concluded that it was bound by precedent and
allowed the annual exclusion for the income interest.198
In 1954, Congress implicitly recognized income interests as present
interests when it amended § 2503(b).199 The amendment provided
that the possibility that a present interest (i.e. an income interest)
might be diminished by the exercise of a power to distribute principal
to the income beneficiary is to be disregarded in determining whether
the gift of the income interest is a future interest.2 0 0 The change was
intended to overrule several court decisions in which the annual ex-
clusion had been denied for income interests on the ground that the
value of the interests could not be determined if the trustee could dis-
tribute principal to the income beneficiary. 2 0 1 Before the amendment,
the result of "giving an income beneficiary an additional right-
namely, a right potentially to enjoy the principal-turned what would
otherwise have been a present interest into a future interest."2 0 2 But
if principal can be distributed among a number of income beneficiaries
or to someone other than the income beneficiary, the value of the in-
come interest will be valued as if maximum principal distributions
196. Id. at 433.
197. Id. at 434 (citation omitted).
198. Id. at 434-35 (citing Commissioner v. Brandegee, 123 F.2d 58 (1st Cir. 1941)).
199. Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-591, § 2503(b), 68A Stat. 1, 404-05;
see S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4621, 5122-23.
200. I.R.C. § 2503(b); Polisher, supra note 158, at 14.
201. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4621,
5122-23; see also Evans v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 435, 437 (3d Cir. 1952); Rev. Rul.
54-92, 1954-1 C.B. 207, declared obsolete by, Rev. Rul. 82-127, 1982-1 C.B. 215.
202. Sherman, supra note 10, at 643.
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will be made.20 3
The rules regarding allowance of the annual exclusion for income
interests have been refined by case law. Brief postponement of the
right to income will result in denial of the exclusion,204 while delays in
income distributions that result from ordinary administrative provi-
sions will not.205 The annual exclusion will be allowed even though
the trust contains a valid spendthrift provision, precluding voluntary
alienation of the income interest.206 The annual exclusion will not be
allowed, however, if the trust assets will not generate income for dis-
tribution to beneficiaries entitled to income. 20 7
Allowance of the annual exclusion for gifts of income interests is
firmly established. Congress implicitly recognized that income inter-
ests are present interests in 1954,208 the Supreme Court apparently
approved the exclusion for income interests in Fondren,209 current
Treasury Regulations specifically allow the exclusion for immediate
and unrestricted income interests, 210 and the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice has long acknowledged availability of the exclusion for such
interests.21 1
Notwithstanding current law, should the annual exclusion be al-
203. See Kniep v. Commissioner, 172 F.2d 755, 757-58 (8th Cir. 1949).
204. Hessenbruch v. Commissioner, 178 F.2d 785, 787 (3d Cir. 1950)(three-month post-
ponement made gift a future interest).
205. Fisher v. Commissioner, 132 F.2d 383, 386 (9th Cir. 1942)(annual distribution);
Commissioner v. Lowden, 131 F.2d 127,128 (7th Cir. 1942)(annual distribution did
not result in denial of annual exclusion where the purpose of the annual payment
was "not to postpone vesting and enjoyment of income until a future date, but to
provide a convenient distributive procedure."); Commissioner v. Kempner, 126
F.2d 853, 854 (5th Cir. 1942)(distribution "as soon as reasonably practicable").
The I.R.S. acknowledged this in Rev. Rul. 83-108, 1983-2 C.B. 168:
In order for an unrestricted income interest to qualify for an annual ex-
clusion under section 2503(b) of the Code, there is no requirement that
the income be distributed to the income beneficiary as it is earned.
Rather, as a matter of convenience in administering the trust, the in-
come need be distributed only annually or more often.
Id (citations omitted).
206. Fisher v. Commissioner, 132 F.2d 383, 386 (9th Cir. 1942); Charles v. Hassett, 43 F.
Supp. 432, 434 (D. Mass. 1942); Rev. Rul. 54-344, 1954-2 C.B. 319.
207. Maryland National Bank v. United States, 609 F.2d 1078, 1080 (4th Cir. 1979)(an-
nual exclusion was denied where taxpayer failed to prove that partnership pro-
duced any income or that there would be any income in the foreseeable future);
Calder v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 713, 728 (1985)(annual exclusion was denied
where trust corpus consisted of artwork and there was no showing that the trust
assets would generate income for distribution).
208. See note 199 supra.
209. Bittker, supra note 85, at 453.
210. Treas. Reg. § 25.2503-3(b)(as amended in 1983).
211. See Rev. RUl. 83-108, 1983-2 C.B. 168; Rev. Rul. 75-506, 1975-2 C.B. 375, 376; Rev.
Rul. 54-344,1954-2 C.B. 319.
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lowed for the transfer of an income interest?212 Does the transfer of
an income interest satisfy the three-part annual exclusion test?
The first requirement of the test is not satisfied. The gift of an
income interest is necessarily the gift of a right to future benefits. The
true subject of the gift (future income, not the right to income) does
not exist at the time of the transfer. Time must pass in order for the
right to result in economic benefit to the donee. Receipt of economic
benefit, moreover, is contingent on the donee's survivorship. The do-
nee might die the day after the interest is created and, in fact, receive
nothing. Economic benefit can be realized only by living and receiving
the income or through sale of the interest. Marketability of property
transferred by gift, however, is not the test for annual exclusion pur-
poses.2 13 Although the transfer of the "right" to enjoyment of income
is immediate, enjoyment is as much in futuro as is enjoyment of prin-
cipal to be distributed in the future. Common sense suggests the
transfer of the right to something not in existence on the date of trans-
fer is necessarily the transfer of a future interest.
The second requirement of the test is not satisfied either. The do-
nee of the income interest for which the annual exclusion is claimed
cannot be ascertained at the time of the transfer. This is not to suggest
that the identity of the person entitled to income under the trust or
other conveyance is not ascertainable, but rather that it cannot be
known at the time the interest is created who, in fact, will receive the
income. If A is given the right to trust income for his life and B is
given a vested remainder interest, the identity of the donees of the
beneficial interests can be determined. But whether A or B will re-
ceive the income for which the annual exclusion is claimed cannot be
determined on the date of transfer. If A dies the day after the inter-
ests are created, the income for which the annual exclusion was
claimed will shift to B, who comes into possession. The exclusion will
have been claimed for a gift to A which was, in fact, received by B.
Mortality tables and life expectancies should not be allowed to substi-
212. Sherman, supra note 10, advocated denial of the annual exclusion for income
interests:
Such gifts [where the donee receives less than full legal and equitable
title] cannot be regarded as the kind of routine gifts Congress sought to
exclude from the transfer tax base. Thus, income interests under such
trusts would no longer qualify for the annual exclusion under the propo-
sal, even if the income was to begin immediately and the right to it was
unconditional.
Id, at 666-67; see also Bittker, supra note 85, at 453 (suggesting that "If pushed to a
drily [sic] logical extreme" the rationale of Pelzer would deny the exclusion for
income interests (at least as to amounts paid in future years) "since enjoyment of
the income is postponed until it is earned by the trust and distributed to the
donee.").
213. See note 121 supra.
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tute for the certainty required to obtain the per-donee annual
exclusion.
Finally, the transfer of an income interest fails under the third
part of the annual exclusion test for two reasons. First, the value of
the gift of income that the donee will receive cannot be determined at
the time of the gift. Although the court in Commissioner v.
Lowden2 14 allowed the annual exclusion for the transfer of an income
interest, it recognized that the value of income interests cannot be de-
termined with certainty:
Until the year is ended, there is no way of ascertaining accurately just how
much each beneficiary will receive. But if mere inability to forecast definitely
the actual income from investments were the sole criterion of whether an in-
terest is future, all present gifts of income accruing in the future could be
classified as nothing other than future even though the right of enjoyment is
immediate. Rents, dividends, indeed, practically all kinds of income are sub-
ject to lapse, change and fluctuation. 2 15
Valuation uncertainty is allowed to be resolved by reference to Treas-
ury Department valuation tables216 where there is proof that income
will be received by the beneficiary.217 While "the United States is in
business with enough different taxpayers so that the law of averages
has ample opportunity to work,"218 the taxpayer should not be held to
have satisfied his burden of proving the value of a present interest
through use of the tables.
The second reason income interests fail to satisfy the third require-
ment is attributable to the lapsing nature of income interests. Even if
future income were determinable with certainty, the identity of the
recipient of that income cannot be determined upon creation of the
income interest. If the income beneficiary dies the day after the inter-
est is created, the income for which the annual exclusion was claimed
will shift to the remainderman who comes into possession. If the do-
nee received a term certain, his estate or heirs would receive the in-
come. Actuarial assumptions should not be used to substitute for the
certainty required to obtain the per-donee annual exclusion.
214. 131 F.2d 127 (7th Cir. 1942).
215. Id. at 128. The court concluded that uncertainty of amount must co-exist with
restrictions upon or postponement of immediate use and enjoyment in order to
result in denial of the exclusion.
216. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-5(f)(as amended in 1984); see also Rev. Rul. 80-80, 1980-1
C.B. 194, 195 (the tables must be used unless the individual who is to serve as the
measuring life "is known to have been afflicted, at the time of transfer, with an
incurable physical condition that is in such an advanced stage that death is clearly
imminent.")
217. Maryland National Bank v. United States, 609 F.2d 1078, 1081 (4th Cir.
1979)("The tables are appropriate only when there is proof that some income will
be received by the trust beneficiaries. ... The tables are designed to calculate the
value of a present interest, not create it."); see also Stark v. United States, 477
F.2d 131, 132-33 (8th Cir. 1973).
218. Gelb v. Commissioner, 298 F.2d 544, 552 (2d Cir. 1962).
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B. Indirect Outright Transfers
The annual exclusion amount is limited on a per-donee basis.219
Taxpayers should not be allowed to avoid the per-donee limitation by
reciprocal transfers (transfers to several transferees as part of a trans-
action in which another transferor makes compensatory transfers) or
transfers through intermediaries (transfers to one person who, pursu-
ant to an understanding or agreement, transfers the property to tax-
payer's intended donee).
1. Reciprocal Gifts
In Furst v. Commissioner220 the taxpayer was one of three related
donors who transferred shares of stock to members of the three do-
nors' family groups.221 The property transferred to each family mem-
ber had a value slightly less than $6,000, the amount that could be
transferred free of gift tax through the combined operation of
§ 2503(b)(the annual exclusion) and § 2513 (spousal gift-splitting).222
Each family group received the same number of shares from the other
two donors as were transferred by the taxpayer.2 23 Furst and the
other donors denied the existence of a prior agreement regarding the
transfers, but admitted that there was, or might have been, some talk
between the transferors before the transfers were made.224
The Tax Court held that taxpayer's purported transfers to the
other donors' family members were not, in substance, gifts to such in-
dividuals, but were gifts to his own children:
Respondent [Commissioner] is right. Such simultaneous, circuitous trans-
fers of identical property (stock) constituted gifts by the transferors to mem-
bers of their own families, of all of the stock they transferred. It is of no
significance under the gift tax statute that each petitioner accomplished the
gifts of stock to members of his or her immediate family by a simultaneous
round-about series of cross-transfers. The taxing statute looks at the realities.
Such devious reciprocal transfers as are here present are singularly unavailing
to manufacture exclusions under a taxing statute that reaches gifts "direct or
indirect."
2 2 5
The taxpayer was the real donor of the stock that the members of his
immediate family received and his annual exclusions were limited by
the number of recipients in his immediate family.226
The court, unable to find any cases involving cross-gifts, relied
219. I.R.C. § 2503(b).
220. 21 T.C.M. (CCH) 1169 (1962).
221. Id at 1170.
222. Id.
223. Id at 1171.
224. Id at 1172.
225. Id
226. Id
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upon the reciprocal trust doctrine to support its decision.227 Under
that doctrine settlors who simultaneously create trusts with the same
provisions and of identical property for the benefit of each other will
be considered the settlor of the trust that is in form created by the
other.2 28 In Estate of Bischoff v. Commissioner,229 decided after
Furst, the court held that the purpose of the reciprocal trust "doctrine
is merely to identify the transferor of property."2 30 Furst anticipated
that holding and disregarded the form of the transfers in favor of their
substance in determining the identities of the donor and donee.
Schultz v. United States23 1 also presented a reciprocal gift pattern.
In 1965, John A. Schultz gave an equal number of shares of stock in a
closely held corporation to each of his three children and to each of his
brother's three children.232 On the same day Schultz's brother made
gifts of the same number of shares of the same corporation to each of
his children and to each of taxpayer's children.233 Similar reciprocal
transfers were made in 1966 and in 1967.234 Schultz claimed the an-
nual exclusion for the transfers to his brother's children.2 35 The dis-
trict court relied upon the reciprocal trust doctrine and directed a
verdict for the government, disallowing the exclusion for those trans-
fers.2 36 The Fourth Circuit affirmed.237 It held that "a reasonable
jury could have concluded only that the taxpayer intended to benefit
his children, rather than those of his brother, by the gifts in ques-
tion."238 The court did not reach the issue of whether the reciprocal
trust doctrine applied to indirect gifts. 239
2. Gifts Through Intermediaries
In Heyen v. United States, Jennie Owen transferred shares of stock
valued at less than the annual exclusion amount to twenty-nine indi-
viduals.240 All but two of the twenty-nine recipients endorsed the
stock certificates in blank, and the shares were reissued to members of
227. IdA.
228. Id
229. 69 T.C. 32 (1977).
230. Id. at 46.
231. 493 F.2d 1225 (4th Cir. 1974).
232. Id.
233. Id
234. Id
235. Id.
236. Id. at 1225-26.
237. Id- at 1226.
238. Id.
239. Id.; see also Tech. Adv. Mem. 87-17-003 (Jan. 17, 1987)(the I.R.S. relied upon
Schultz, the substance over form doctrine, and the reciprocal trust doctrine in
denying the annual exclusion in a cross-gift situation).
240. Heyen v. United States, 945 F.2d 359, 361 (10th Cir. 1991).
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Owen's family. 24 The twenty-nine "donees" either did not know they
were receiving a gift or had agreed before receipt that they would en-
dorse the stock certificates in order that the stock could be reissued to
members of Owen's family.242 It was Owen's wish to avoid gift
taxes.243 Owen died nine months after the transfers.2 4 4 Owen's exec-
utor filed a gift tax return but did not report the twenty-nine stock
transfers.245 It was the executor's position that Owen had made sepa-
rate gifts to the intermediate recipients, who voluntarily permitted re-
transfer to decedent's family members.246
The Tenth Circuit held that Owen had merely used the intermedi-
ary transferees to create gift tax exclusions in order to avoid paying
gift taxes on indirect gifts to family members.247 The court held that
the substance over form doctrine applies to the gift tax and that
"[d]ecedent's initial transfer of stock to nonfamily members is not de-
terminative." 248 Section 2511(a) required consideration of whether de-
cedent had made indirect transfers.249 The actual donees of the gifts
had to be identified despite the naming of beneficiaries by the do-
nor.250 The annual exclusion was allowed for the transfers to the two
individuals who had kept the stock because "the end result was not
the same,"251 but was denied for all other transfers.252 The court up-
held the jury's finding that the executor had intended to evade gift
taxes by filing a fraudulent gift tax return.253
Section 2511(a) specifically provides that the gift tax applies to in-
direct transfers. Treasury Regulations contain the following examples
of indirect gifts:
(2) The transfer of property to B if there is imposed upon B the obligation
of paying a commensurate annuity to C is a gift to C.
(3) The payment of money or the transfer of property to B in considera-
tion of B's promise to render a service to C is a gift to C, or to both B and C,
depending on whether the service is or is not an adequate and full considera-
tion in money or money's worth for that which is received by B.2M
Indirect transfers in reciprocal gifts and gifts through intermediary
241. Id.
242. Id
243. Id
244. Id
245. I&
246. I& at 362.
247. Id. at 363.
248. Id. at 362-63.
249. Id- at 363.
250. I&
251. Id
252. Id-
253. Id. at 364-65.
254. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(h)(2),(3)(as amended in 1986).
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situations are in substance conditional transfers;255 the transfers are
made on the condition (agreement or understanding) that a compensa-
tory gift will be made in the reciprocal gift situation and that the inter-
mediary recipient will transfer the property to the intended donee in
the intermediary gift situation. The trial court in Heyen recognized
this when it stated that the donor "may have never parted with own-
ership and control of the stock during the first transfer."256 Dominion
and control were relinquished, and the gift became complete when the
agent reconveyed to the intended family donee.257
The second requirement under the three-part annual exclusion
test is identification of the donee of the present interest. These cases
stand for the principle that the substance over form doctrine requires
determination of the actual donor and donee regardless of the form
employed. The exclusion's per-donee limitation should be enforced;
the exclusion should not be allowed for a transfer to one person which
is in fact a transfer to another. None of the courts in these cases dis-
cussed the burden of proof or required that the Commissioner prove
the existence of an agreement or understanding between the parties
before an indirect gift was found. The courts were justified in con-
cluding that the transfers were part of an integrated transaction un-
dertaken to obtain multiple annual exclusions for gifts to a limited
number of donees.
C. Nonlapsing Demand Powers
John W. Kieckhefer transferred property to a trust for his minor
grandchild in 1944.258 The trustee could distribute income and princi-
pal to or on behalf of the grandchild as the trustee determined to be
necessary for the grandchild's education, comfort, and support.25 9
Any income not required for such purposes was to be accumulated.260
Accumulated income and principal were to be distributed to the
255. Cf Guaranty Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 98 F.2d 62, 65-66 (2d Cir. 1938)(gifts
were not made by husband who transferred funds to wife on condition that she
create a trust that would lend the funds to husband); accord Johnson v. Commis-
sioner, 86 F.2d 710, 712-13 (2d Cir. 1936).
256. Heyen v. United States, 731 F. Supp. 1488, 1493 (D. Kan. 1990), affd, 945 F.2d 359
(10th Cir. 1991).
257. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(h)(as amended in 1983). The second sentence of the
regulation provides:
If the donor delivers the [properly indorsed] stock certificate to his bank
or broker as his agent, or to the issuing corporation or its transfer agent,
for transfer into the name of the donee, the gift is completed on the date
the stock is transferred on the books of the corporation.
Id,
258. Kieckhefer v. Commissioner, 189 F.2d 118, 119 (7th Cir. 1951).
259. Id.
260. Id.
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grandchild at age twenty-one.261 If the grandchild died before age
twenty-one, the accumulated income and principal would be distrib-
uted to the grandchild's estate.2 62 The trust granted the grandchild or
his legally appointed guardian a nonlapsing power to demand distribu-
tion or termination of the trust.263 But no guardian had been
appointed.264
The trustee in Kieckhefer was "required 'at any time' to pay the
trust estate to the minor beneficiary upon demand made as pro-
vided."265 Kieckhefer required the court to determine whether the an-
nual exclusion would be allowed for the transfer of property subject to
a minor donee's nonlapsing general power of appointment, a question
of first impression.26 6
The Seventh Circuit assumed that the annual exclusion would
have been allowed if the trust beneficiary had been an adult. 26 7 An
adult beneficiary "could immediately have made a demand upon the
trustee and have received the trust property."2 68 The court found that
the restrictions on the gift "if they exist, are the result solely of the
disability of the beneficiary due to the fact that he is a minor."269
Cases in which the annual exclusion had been denied because of do-
nor-imposed restrictions were distinguished. 270 The court held that
restrictions imposed by law due to the beneficiary's minority did not
transform what would otherwise be a gift of a present interest into one
of a future interest.271
The Seventh Circuit relied upon Fondren and focused on the do-
nee's right to enjoy the property, rather than on his actual enjoyment:
It is not, however, the use, possession, or enjoyment by the beneficiary which
marks the dividing line between a present and a future interest, but it is the
right conferred upon the beneficiary to such use, possession or enjoyment. As
was said in the Fondren case " ... it is not enough to bring the exclusion into
force that the donee has vested rights. In addition he must have the right
presently to use, possess, or enjoy the property.' 2 7 2
The court allowed the annual exclusion for the transfers subject to the
nonlapsing demand power.2 73
The Second Circuit refused to follow the Seventh Circuit's ap-
261. Id.
262. Id
263. Id. at 120.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. IM
267. Id. at 121.
268. Id-
269. Id. at 120.
270. Id.
271. Id at 122.
272. Id at 121 (citation omitted).
273. Id. at 122.
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proach in Stifel v. Commissioner.274 Arthur C. Stifel, Jr., created
three separate irrevocable trusts for his minor children in 1948.275
The trustee could accumulate income during the beneficiaries' minor-
ity.276 Accumulated income would be distributed to the beneficiary at
age twenty-one.277 If a beneficiary died before attaining age twenty-
one, accumulated income, if any, and trust principal would be distrib-
uted to the beneficiary's estate.278 The trust granted the beneficiary
the right, which could be exercised during minority by a guardian ap-
pointed for such purpose by a court, to terminate the trust, in whole or
in part, and to demand distribution of the entire trust at any time.2 79
However, no guardian had been appointed.2o
The Second Circuit rejected the Seventh Circuit's conclusion that
restrictions which result from the beneficiary's age rather than under
the trust instrument should be ignored:
[1In Fondren v. Commissioner and Commissioner v. Disston, the Supreme
Court, in determining the nature of the rights conferred by the trust instru-
ments, took account of "surrounding circumstances"; the Court, in reaching
its determinations, did not irrevocably lock itself inside the "four corners" of
the writings but held that the key might lie outside. Were this not the rule, a
donor could make gifts which on paper were 100% present but in practice
were 100% future.2 8 1
The Second Circuit examined the surrounding circumstances in Stifel
to determine whether anyone was capable of exercising the demand
right.282
The Second Circuit acknowledged that a present interest gift
would have been made if the demand right had been given to an
adult.283 But a contrary conclusion was required where none of the
children could make the demand (which the court found could only
have been made through a guardian) and no guardian had been ap-
pointed.28 4 The court's decision in Stifel rested on its conclusion that
no one existed who could exercise the demand right.285 It acknowl-
edged that a different result might have been reached if a guardian
had been appointed:
If here, for instance, the donor had, in the instrument, appointed a guardian to
274. 197 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1952).
275. Id. at 108.
276. Id. at 108-09.
277. Id. at 109.
278. Stifel v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 647, 648 (1951); affd, 197 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1952).
279. Stifel v. Commissioner, 197 F.2d 107, 109 (2d Cir. 1952).
280. Id. at 110.
281. Id. (citations omitted).
282. Id. at 110-11; see Note, Gifts to Minors as Present Interests for Purposes of the
Annual Exclusion to the Federal Gift Tax, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 530, 536 (1953).
283. Stifel v. Commissioner, 197 F.2d 107, 109-10 (2d Cir. 1952).
284. Id. at 110-11.
285. Id. at 111; see Gifts to Minors as Present Interests for Purposes of the Annual
Exclusion to the Federal Gift Tax, supra note 283, at 535.
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exercise the children's election rights, or indeed even if a next best friend of
the children had successfully petitioned for one at the time the trust first was
set up, the result might very well be different. Then there would have been
someone who, on the children's behalf, could have made an effective
demand .... 286
If a guardian capable of making the demand had existed, the court
opined that it would be appropriate to determine the donor's influence
on the guardian.2 87 The inference is that the court might have em-
ployed the substance over form doctrine to determine whether there
was an agreement or understanding that the demand power would not
be exercised.2 8 8
The Second Circuit misinterpreted and misapplied the Supreme
Court's use of "surrounding circumstances" in Fondren and Disston.
The issues in those cases were whether transfers in trust for benefi-
ciaries entitled to distributions for "personal comfort, support, mainte-
nance and welfare"2 8 9 and "as may be necessary for . . . education,
comfort and support"2 90 were of present interests. The Court ex-
amined the trust instruments and surrounding circumstances to deter-
mine whether the trusts granted the donees conditional or
unrestricted rights. "In each of those cases, the court was dealing with
trust agreements which by their terms contained the restrictions and
conditions which led the court to decide that the gifts were of a future
interest."291 The Supreme Court was not confronted, as was the Sec-
ond Circuit in Stifel, with the grant of an unrestricted right.
The Sixth Circuit followed Kieckhefer in allowing the annual ex-
clusion for the transfer of property subject to a nonlapsing demand
power in Gilmore v. Commissioner.292 It focused on the donee's right
to use, possess, or enjoy the property, not on the donee's capacity.293
The court did not discuss the fact that no guardians had been ap-
286. Stifel v. Commissioner, 197 F.2d 107, 110-11 (2d Cir. 1952).
287. Id at 110 n.5 ("It would then seem to be proper to consider the actual facts as to
the father's influence on the guardian appointed.").
288. See Gifts to Minors as Present Interests for Purposes of the Annual Exclusion to
the Federal Gift Tax, supra note 282, at 535 (suggesting that the court contem-
plated use of an illusory transfer analysis).
289. Commissioner v. Fondren, 324 U.S. 18, 22 (1945).
290. Commissioner v. Disston, 325 U.S. 442, 444 (1945).
291. Kieckhefer v. Commissioner, 189 F.2d 118, 120 (7th Cir. 1951).
292. 213 F.2d 520, 522 (6th Cir. 1954). Gilmore transferred property in trusts for her
seven minor grandchildren. The trustees were required to distribute trust in-
come and principal to the beneficiary upon the beneficiary's demand. If the bene-
ficiary died before trust distribution, accumulated income and trust principal
would be distributed to the beneficiary's estate. No guardians had been appointed
for any of the beneficiaries. The court held that the trustees' authority to invest
in non-income-producing property and to determine whether a beneficiary was
incompetent, and, in that case, to make payments for the benefit of the benefici-
ary, did not result in denial of the annual exclusion. The existence of a spend-
thrift provision, similarly, had no effect on allowance of the exclusion.
293. Id- at 522.
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pointed.2 94 Stifel was not mentioned.
In Perkins v. Commissioner295 the Tax Court had to decide
whether George W. Perkins was entitled to the annual exclusion for
transfers to a trust that gave each trust beneficiary, his parent, and his
duly appointed guardian the right, at any time, to demand trust princi-
pal or accumulated income.296 A guardian had been appointed for
only one of the seven minor beneficiaries at the time of two of the
gifts.297
The court suggested that under Stifel, if the settlor had limited the
demand power to the beneficiaries or their guardians, the annual ex-
clusion might have been denied for the transfers where guardians had
not been appointed.298 In that case there would have been no one ca-
pable of making an effective demand.299 The court, however, did not
have to decide between Kieckhefer and Stifel because the demand
"right was also given to the adult parents of the beneficiaries, none of
whom appears to have been incompetent to exercise the power thus
bestowed."300 Because someone existed who could exercise the de-
mand rights, there was no substantial bar to present use, possession,
and enjoyment.3 0' The annual exclusion could have been allowed
under either Kieckhefer or Stifel.
The donor's expectation that the rights would not be exercised did
not vitiate "the clear right unmistakenly given."302 Regardless of the
motive, hopes, or expectations of the taxpayers, the court refused to
hold that "the parents of the beneficiaries did not indeed have the
right to make such demand at any time."303 The demand of a parent
could not have been resisted by the trustees.304 The substance over
form doctrine did not require a different result because "the legal
rights in question were created by the trust instruments and could at
any time thereafter be exercised."05 The court recognized that the
294. Gilmore v. Commissioner, 20 T.C. 579, 582 (1953), rev'd, 213 F.2d 520 (6th Cir.
1954).
295. 27 T.C. 601 (1956). George W. Perkins created separate irrevocable trusts for his
seven grandchildren. The trustees could apply income or principal for the
grandchildren's education, support, and maintenance in their discretion during
minority. Undistributed income was to be accumulated. Accumulated income
and net income were to be distributed to the beneficiary upon attainment of age
twenty-one. The trusts would terminate with full distribution to the beneficiary
when the beneficiary reached age twenty-five.
296. Id at 603-04.
297. Id at 604-605.
298. Id
299. Id at 605.
300. Id
301. Id
302. Id at 605.
303. Id at 606.
304. Id at 605.
305. Id at 606 (emphasis added).
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nonlapsing nature of the demand rights meant the substance of the
transaction was consistent with its form.
In Trust No. 3 v. Commissioner30 6 the Seventh Circuit reaffirmed
its decision in Kieckhefer in an income tax case. Each minor benefici-
ary or his legally appointed guardian was given the right under the
trust to demand distribution of his trust at any time.3 07 Guardians,
however, had not been appointed for any of the children.308 The Sev-
enth Circuit held that trust income was taxable to the beneficiaries
under I.R.C. § 678 because of their power to appoint the property in
their own favor.3 09 Completion of routine steps, including the ap-
pointment of a guardian, that would have been necessary for exercise
of the demand rights did not negate the validity of the rights.3.0
The important facts in each of the foregoing cases were that the
donors granted minor beneficiaries, and usually their guardians, im-
mediately exercisable, nonlapsing, demand powers over trust contri-
butions. Separate trusts were created for each beneficiary or separate
shares were maintained. With the possible exception of the trust in
Perkins v. Commissioner,3 11 the trust assets were to be distributed to
the donee's estate if the donee died before trust termination.
The Seventh Circuit in Kieckhefer adopted a purely objective test:
Was a right to demand trust property granted?312 If so, the transfer
qualified for the annual exclusion. The Second Circuit in Stifel
adopted a two-part objective test: Was a right to demand trust prop-
erty granted? If so, was there anyone capable of immediately exercis-
ing the right?3 13 The court in Stifel, however, suggested that if the
two-part objective test had been satisfied, the exclusion might still
have been denied under the substance over form doctrine.3 14
306. 285 F.2d 102 (7th Cir. 1960). Charles E. Brehm and Margaret F. Brehm estab-
lished a trust for their minor children. The trustees could use trust income and
principal for the education, comfort, and support of the beneficiaries. Any in-
come not so needed was to be accumulated. The trust was to terminate when a
child attained age twenty-five, at which time the trustee was to distribute an
equal share of the trust to the beneficiary. If a child died before attaining age
twenty-five, the child's share would be distributed to her estate.
307. Id. at 104.
308. Id.
309. Id. at 105-06.
310. Id. at 106.
311. Distribution of trust property in the event of death of a beneficiary is unclear
from the facts in Perkins v. Commissioner, 27 T.C. 601, 604 (1956)("Various provi-
sions governed the distribution of any remaining principal and income should a
beneficiary predecease the trust.").
312. See Dwight Rogers, Dissents and Concurrences, Stifel Stifles Kieckhefer, 7 TAX
L. REV. 500, 502 (1952); see also Gifts to Minors as Present Interests for Purposes
of the Annual Exclusion to the Federal Gift Tax, supra note 282, at 535.
313. Gifts to Minors as Present Interests for Purposes of the Annual Exclusion to the
Federal Gift Tax, supra note 282, at 535.
314. Stifel v. Commissioner, 197 F.2d 107, 110 n.5 (2d Cir. 1952).
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The demand rights granted the beneficiaries in these cases were
immediately exercisable, nonlapsing, general powers of appoint-
ment.31 5 General powers of appointment, for tax purposes, have long
been regarded by the Supreme Court "as equivalent to ownership of
the property subject to the power."316 Because the donee of an inme-
diately exercisable general power is able to take immediate possession
of the property subject to the power by the mere making of a demand,
the donee is treated as the owner of the property for income, gift, es-
tate, and generation-skipping transfer tax purposes.317
The transfer of property subject to an immediately exercisable,
nonlapsing, general power of appointment should be treated as the
equivalent of an outright gift for annual exclusion purposes. The
courts in Kieckhefer and Stifel implicitly recognized this when they
assumed that transfers subject to such powers held by adults would
have qualified for the annual exclusion. The Tax Court in Perkins
recognized that the nonlapsing nature of such a demand right meant
that the substance of the transaction was consistent with its form.
None of the courts, however, cited the tax consequences to the donee
as supporting or influencing their decisions on the annual exclusion
issue.3 1 8
315. See I.R.C. §§ 2041, 2514. Sections 2041(b)(1) and 2514(c) define a general power of
appointment, with certain exceptions, as a power exercisable in favor of the
powerholder, his estate, his creditors, or the creditors of his estate. Treas. Reg.
§ 20.2041-1(b)(1)(as amended in 1961) provides that "if a trust instrument pro-
vides that the beneficiary may appropriate or consume the principal of the trust,
the power to consume or appropriate is a power of appointment."
316. Curry v. McCanless, 307 U.S. 357, 371 (1939); accord Ryerson v. United States, 312
U.S. 405, 408 (1941)("[A] present power of disposition for one's own benefit is the
equivalent of ownership.. . ")(citation omitted).
317. I.R.C. §§ 678, 2514, 2041, and 2652(a)(1). The tax consequences to the donee of a
general power of appointment must be considered when such powers are granted.
Possession and lapse of a general power of appointment may have adverse in-
come, gift, estate, and generation-skipping transfer tax consequences. See gener-
ally Roy M. Adams, Powers of Withdrawal Held Individually or as a Fiduciary:
A Pandora's Box of Tax Consequences, 23 INsT. ON EsT. PLAN. 19-1 (1989); William
S. Huff, The "Five and Five" Power and Lapsed Powers of Withdrawal, 15 INST.
ON EsT. PLAN. 7-1 (1981); Malcolm A. Moore, Tax Consequences and Uses of
"Crummey" Withdrawal Powers: An Update, 22 INST. ON EST. PLAN. 11-1 (1988);
Federal Transfer Tax Consequences to the Donee of Annually Lapsing Powers of
Withdrawal, 22 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 693 (Jeffrey N. Pennell ed., 1987);
Charlotte McCown Wilson, Note, The Crummey Power and Inter Vivos Trusts:
An Analysis of Estate, Gift and Income Tax Consequences to the Trust Benefici-
ary, 22 MEm. ST. U. L. REv. 297 (1992).
318. This is not to suggest that allowing the annual exclusion should always corre-
spond with the tax consequences to the donee. While the transfer of property
subject to an immediately exercisable, nonlapsing general power of appointment
should be treated as the transfer of a present interest, a transfer subject to a
testamentary general power of appointment should not. In the latter case, the
donee has not received the right to presently enjoy the property, even though the
property would be included in his gross estate under I.R.C. § 2041.
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The requirement that the donee make a demand in order to obtain
the use, possession, or enjoyment of the property subject to the
nonlapsing demand power should not result in denial of the exclu-
sion.319 It is the right to enjoy,320 rather than actual enjoyment, that is
determinative for annual exclusion purposes.32 1
The fact that a guardian must be appointed for a minor in order
that someone is capable of exercising the demand right should not af-
fect allowance of the annual exclusion. Kieckhefer, not Stifel, was de-
cided correctly. I.R.C. § 2056(b)(5) allows the marital deduction for
the transfer to a spouse of a life estate coupled with a power of ap-
pointment in favor of the spouse or her estate. The general power of
appointment must be exercisable by the spouse alone and in all
events.322 Incapacity of the spouse will not result in denial of the mar-
ital deduction; creation of the power of appointment is sufficient.3 23
Similarly, creation of an immediately exercisable, nonlapsing, general
power of appointment should be sufficient to obtain the annual
exclusion.
The Kieckhefer-Stifel conflict led to enactment of I.R.C.
§ 2503(c). 3 24 A transfer for a minor will qualify for the annual exclu-
sion under § 2503(c) if the three requirements of that section are satis-
fied. The transfer of property subject to an immediately exercisable,
nonlapsing, general power of appointment satisfies the spirit, if not
the letter, of § 2503(c). First, the property and its income are subject
to being expended by or for the benefit of the donee through the do-
nee's (or his guardian's) exercise of the nonlapsing general power of
appointment. 3 25 Second, the beneficiary can obtain the property and
319. See Heidrich v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 746, 753 (1971)("While making such a writ-
ten demand [for distribution] might constitute a 'positive act' . . . some sort of
positive action, whether it be signing a check or physically grasping a corporate
bond, is almost always necessary to place property within one's absolute and im-
mediate possession."); Rev. Rul. 83-108, 1983-2 C.B. 168, 168; Rev. Rul. 80-261,
1980-2 C.B. 279, 280; Rev. Rul. 75-415, 1975-2 C.B. 374, 375 ("The fact that the
payment of income or principal is not required to commence immediately but is
subject to the demand of the income beneficiary does not constitute a barrier to
present enjoyment of the transferred interest contemplated by the Supreme
Court.").
320. Fondren v. Commissioner, 324 U.S. 18, 20 (1945); Kieckhefer v. Commissioner, 189
F.2d 118, 121 (7th Cir. 1951).
321. Kieckhefer v. Commissioner, 189 F.2d 118, 121 (7th Cir. 1951).
322. I.R.C. § 2056(b)(5).
323. Estate of Gilchrit v. Commissioner, 630 F.2d 340, 343-45 (5th Cir. 1980); Estate of
Alperstein v. Commissioner, 613 F.2d 1213, 1217-19 (2d Cir. 1979), cert denied sub
nom., Greenberg v. Commissioner, 446 U.S. 918 (1980); Rev. Rul. 75-350, 1975-2
C.B. 366, 368.
324. Leimberg, supra note 138, at 42-25 to 42-26 n.50.
325. The issue under I.R.C. § 2503(c) would appear to be whether the requirement
that the minor or his guardian make the demand (or the requirement that a
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its income at age twenty-one through exercise of the power.3 26 Third,
if the minor dies before age twenty-one, the trust estate will be in-
cluded in the donee's gross estate for estate tax purposes by virtue of
the nonlapsing general power of appointment.3 27 Moreover, for pur-
poses of § 2503(c), "the fact that under the local law a minor is under a
disability to exercise an inter vivos power or to execute a will does not
cause the transfer to fail to satisfy the conditions of section 2503(c)."3 28
The transfer of property subject to an immediately exercisable,
nonlapsing, general power of appointment satisfies the three-part an-
nual exclusion test. First, such a power grants the holder the
equivalent of outright ownership and should be considered a present
interest. Second, the identity of the donee can be determined. Third,
the value of the property subject to the nonlapsing demand power can
be ascertained.
D. Lapsing Demand Powers
1. Crummey v. Commissioner 329
In Crummey v. Commissioner the Ninth Circuit had to decide
whether the annual exclusion would be allowed for the transfer of
property subject to an immediately exercisable, lapsing, general power
of appointment where the donee had limited rights in the trust after
lapse of the power. On February 12, 1962, D. Clifford Crummey and
his wife executed an irrevocable trust for the benefit of their four chil-
dren.330 Contributions to the trust were to be divided into separate
trusts for the children, unless otherwise designated by the trans-
feror.33' Each child was given the right to demand the lesser of $4,000
or the amount of a transfer on his behalf on or before December 31st
of the year in which the transfer was made.332 If a child was a minor
at the time of the gift or failed in legal capacity for any reason, the
child's guardian could make the demand on the child's behalf.333
guardian be appointed) makes expenditures subject to "substantial restrictions"
under Treas. Reg. § 25.2503-4(b)(1)(1958).
326. See Heidrich v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 746, 752-53 (1971)(continuing right to de-
mand property by giving written notice to the trustee sufficient for purposes of
I.R.C. § 2503(c)(2)(A)); see also Rev. Rul. 74-43, 1974-1 C.B. 285, 286.
327. I.R.C. § 2041; see I.R.C. § 2503(c)(2)(B).
328. Treas. Reg. § 25.2503-4(b)(1958). This is consistent with case law holding that ca-
pacity to exercise a general power of appointment is irrelevant under § 2041. See,
e.g. Boeving v. United States, 650 F.2d 493, 495 (8th Cir. 1981); Williams v. United
States, 634 F.2d 894, 894 (5th Cir. 1981)(per curiam); Estate of Gilchrist v. Com-
missioner, 630 F.2d 340, 343-45 (5th Cir. 1980); Estate of Vissering v. Commis-
sioner, 96 T.C. 749, 758-60 (1991).
329. 397 F.2d 82 (9th Cir. 1968).
330. I& at 82.
331. Id. at 83.
332. I&
333. Id-
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If no demand was made the addition would continue in trust.
Trust income was to be accumulated during the beneficiary's minority
unless the trustee made discretionary distributions to a "needy benefi-
ciary."334 Trust income was to be distributed to the beneficiary be-
tween the ages of twenty-one and thirty-five.3 35 After age thirty-five,
the trustee again had discretion to distribute income and principal.3 36
If a child died before age thirty-five, the child's trust would go to the
child's surviving issue, if any, or if none, equally to the trusts for the
grantors' surviving children.3 37
At all relevant times the minor children lived with their parents,
and no legal guardians had been appointed.3 3 8 The children were sup-
ported by their parents and none ever made a demand against the
trust or received any distribution from the trust.339 The Crummeys
made contributions to the trust in 1962 and 1963.340 One of the chil-
dren was older than twenty-one years of age at the time of the 1962
contribution; two were in 1963.341
The Ninth Circuit read Kieckhefer as employing a right-to-enjoy
test.342 If the court had used the Kieckhefer approach, it would have
allowed annual exclusions for the transfers for all beneficiaries.3 43
The court, however, declined to follow Kieckhefer.3 44 It concluded
that allowing the exclusion for transfers subject to the demand rights,
without anyone capable of immediately exercising the rights, was too
broad on the facts of Crummey.345 If the minors could not have made
a demand, more than just postponement of enjoyment was involved
because the beneficiaries, after lapse of the powers, never again had a
right to trust principal.3 46
The Ninth Circuit read Stifel as employing a likelihood of present
334. Id- at 86.
335. Id
336. Id.
337. Cruimmey v. Commissioner, 25 T.C.M. (CCH) 772, 773 (1966), rev'd in part, 397
F.2d 82 (9th Cir. 1968).
338. Crummey v. Commissioner, 397 F.2d 82, 84 (9th Cir. 1968).
339. Id
340. Id. at 82-83.
341. Id. at 82.
342. Id. at 85-86. The court stated:
Kieckhefer... says that a gift to a minor is not a "future interest" if the
only reason for a delay in enjoyment is the minority status of the donee
and his consequent disabilities.... The court equated a present interest
with a present right to possess, use or enjoy.... [I]t was really equating a
present interest with a present right to possess, use or enjoy except for
the fact that the beneficiary was a minor.
Id.
343. Id. at 88.
344. Id.
345. Id.
346. Id.
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enjoyment test.3 4 7 If the court had employed the Stifel approach, it
would have denied the annual exclusions because it was not likely,
considering the surrounding circumstances, that the minors would re-
ceive immediate use, possession, or enjoyment of the property.3 48 The
court, however, rejected Stifel on the basis that it was "inconsistent
and unfair." 4 9 It was no more likely that an adult beneficiary would
make a demand than would a minor beneficiary.5 0 Yet, the I.R.S.
would allow the exclusion for the transfers for the adults, but not for
the minors.351
The court believed it was charting a middle course:
In between these two positions (Kieckhefer and Stifel] there is a third possibil-
ity. That possibility is that the court should determine whether the donee is
legally and technically capable of immediately enjoying the property. Basi-
cally this is the test employed by the petitioners [taxpayers]. Under this the-
ory, the question would be whether the donee could possibly gain immediate
enjoyment and the emphasis would be on the trust instrument and the laws of
the jurisdiction as to minors. It was primarily on this basis that the Tax Court
decided the present case. This theory appears to be the basis of the decision in
George W. Perkins. There the Tax Court stated that where the parents were
capable of making the demand and there was no showing that the demand
could be resisted, the gift was of a present interest.3 5 2
The court concluded that exclusions should be allowed for transfers
subject to the lapsing demand rights under 'the Perkins test or the
'right to enjoy' test in Gilmore."353
The Ninth Circuit determined that the minors' demand rights in
Crummey could have been exercised in two ways.3 5 4 A minor could
have informed the trustee that he demanded his share, which would
have resulted in the trustee's petitioning for appointment of a guard-
ian.35 5 Alternatively, a parent could have made a demand as natural
guardian for a minor, which would also have led to appointment of a
guardian.356
The Ninth Circuit misread Stifel. Stifel did not rest on a facts-and-
347. Id at 85. The court stated:
As we read the Stifel case, it says that the court should look at the trust
instrument, the law as to minors, and the financial and other circum-
stances of the parties. From this examination it is up to the court to de-
termine whether it is likely that the minor beneficiary is to receive any
present enjoyment of the property. If it is not likely, then the gift is one
of a "future interest."
Id.
348. Id- at 88.
349. I&
350. Id.
351. Id.
352. Id at 86 (citation omitted).
353. Id at 88.
354. Id. at 87.
355. Id
356. Id-
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circumstances determination of whether it was "likely" that the donee
would receive immediate use, enjoyment or possession of the property,
but rather on the court's conclusion that no one existed who could
effectively exercise the demand right.357 The beneficiaries in Stifel
could not make an effective demand because of the disabilities of mi-
nority and because no guardians had been appointed who could have
made the demand.3 58 A present interest might have been found in
Stifel if guardians had been appointed.3 59 Surrounding circumstances
were used to determine the "nature of the rights conferred," 360 not
whether it was likely that the donee would receive present enjoyment.
The court concluded that the transfers subject to demand rights were
not present interests because no one existed "who could exercise" the
rights,361 not because the donees were not likely to receive present
enjoyment because of financial and other circumstances. Moreover,
the dictum suggesting that the court would "consider the actual facts
as to the father's influence on the guardian" is suggestive of a sub-
stance over form analysis, not a likelihood of enjoyment analysis.
The Ninth Circuit also misread Perkins. It characterized Perkins
as requiring a finding that a demand could not be resisted.362 The Tax
Court, however, allowed annual exclusions in Perkins because of the
"right unmistakenly given" and because the donee's parents were
given the power to immediately exercise the demand right.363 Stifel's
two-part test was thus satisfied: An immediately exercisable demand
right was granted, and someone was capable of exercising the right. If
the Tax Court had used Kieckhefer's "right to enjoy" test in Perkins, it
would not have mattered that the parents could have exercised the
right. This suggests that the Tax Court in Perkins followed Stifel.364
If the parents had not been granted the right to make the demand, the
annual exclusion might also have been denied in Perkins under
Stifel.365
The Ninth Circuit's reference in Crummey to Gilmore's "right to
enjoy" test is also puzzling. Gilmore adopted and followed the "right
to enjoy" test articulated in Kieckhefer. The right to enjoy test is in-
consistent with a required showing that "the donee is legally and tech-
357. Stifel v. Commissioner, 197 F.2d 107, 111 (2d Cir. 1952); see also Gifts to Minors as
Present Interests for Purposes of the Annual Exclusion to the Federal Gift Tax,
supra note 282, at 535; see also notes 281-88 and accompanying text supra.
358. Stifel v. Commissioner, 197 F.2d 107, 110 (2d Cir. 1952)
359. Id.
360. Id.
361. Id. at 111.
362. Crummey v. Commissioner, 397 F.2d 82, 88 (9th Cir. 1968).
363. Perkins v. Commissioner, 27 T.C. 601, 605 (1956).
364. Sherman, supra note 10, at 658 n.295 (concluding that the Tax Court followed
Stifel in Perkins).
365. Perkins v. Commissioner, 27 T.C. 601, 605 (1956).
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nically capable of immediately enjoying the property." The existence
of the immediately exercisable, nonlapsing, demand right resulted in
allowance of the exclusion in Gilmore; the court made no finding that
the donee was capable of exercising the right.
The Ninth Circuit's approach in Crummey requires a determina-
tion that the transfer was subject to a demand right and that the donee
was legally and technically capable of immediately enjoying the prop-
erty.366 This is essentially the same test employed by the Second Cir-
cuit in Stifel.
Notwithstanding Crummey, should the annual exclusion be al-
lowed for the transfer of property subject to immediately exercisable,
lapsing demand powers?36 7 Does a transfer subject to such a power
satisfy the three-part annual exclusion test?
The annual exclusion should have been denied in Crummey, not
only for the transfers on behalf of the minor donees, but also for the
transfers on behalf of the adult donees. Transfers subject to lapsing
demand powers should not qualify for the annual exclusion.
The Ninth Circuit should have adopted Kieckhefer's right to enjoy
test and engaged in a substance over form analysis. It should have
examined the trust instrument and the surrounding circumstances to
determine the substance of the transfer for which the annual exclu-
sion was claimed. It was apparent to the court that current benefits
were not intended for the donees of the lapsing demand powers in
Crummey:
366. Crummey v. Commissioner, 397 F.2d 82, 86 (9th Cir. 1968).
367. Crummey has been the subject of substantial comment and criticism. E.g.,
Casner, supra note 79, at 9-6 ("The annual exclusion, when it can be used in this
way [through a Crummey demand power), has become a sophisticated estate
planning device that permits the accomplishment of goals other than the ones it
was designed to achieve."); Dodge, supra note 89, at 344 ('"e oft-used Crummey
device should be abolished."); Willard H. Pedrick, Crummey Is Really Crummey!,
20 ARiz. ST. L.J. 943,948 (1988)('"e decision in Crummey must be characterized
as a blatant, shocking misinterpretation of Section 2503(b) of the Code."); Vlet-
stra, supra note 175, at 596 ("[Regardless of its legal support ..... Crummey,
amounts to judicial consent to a sham that circumvents the transfer tax sys-
tem."); Benjamin N. Henszey, Crummey Power Revisited, 59 TAXES 76, 77
(1981) ("[Ihe IRS is aware that the demand power is a sham in most cases and, as
a result, may try to severely curtail it in the future for policy as well as revenue
reasons."); Matthew Monippallil, Life Insurance as an Estate Planning Tool, TAX
ADVIsER, May 1990, 308, 317 ("[M]ost irrevocable trusts created today are grafted
with Crummey powers, demonstrating the most egregious example of form over
substance and legalistic ritual over economic reality."); Rothberg, supra note 123,
described the notice process:
The process can thus take on an unreal quality, carefully choreographed
by the attorney or other practitioner, in which a husband gives a notice
to his wife on behalf of their new-born child, and neither one under-
stands how such an action so lacking in substance can have tax
significance.
I& at 132-33.
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[T]he surrounding facts indicate that the children were well cared for and the
obvious intention of the trustors was to create a long term trust. No guardian
had been appointed and, except for the tax difficulties, probably would never
be appointed. As a practical matter, it is likely that some, if not all, of the
beneficiaries did not even know that they had any right to demand funds from
the trust. They probably did not know when contributions were made to the
trust or in what amounts. Even had they known, the substantial contributions
were made toward the end of the year so that the time to make a demand was
severely limited. Nobody had made a demand under the provision, and no
distributions had been made. We think it was unlikely that any demand ever
would have been made.3 6 8
The court, however, focused on the form, not the substance of the de-
mand rights.
The court should have inferred the existence of an agreement or
understanding between the donors and donees that the lapsing de-
mand powers would not be exercised. The existence of such an agree-
ment or understanding would have negated the substance and validity
of the demand rights. The burden should have been placed upon the
taxpayers to disprove the existence of such an implied agreement or
understanding. The taxpayers could not have met that burden. If the
donees were intended to receive "substantial present economic bene-
fit,"369 the demand powers would have been nonlapsing, and the do-
nees' rights in the continuing trust would not have been limited. The
lapsing demand powers appear to have been provided merely to obtain
the annual exclusion and to avoid gift and estate taxes. The trust pro-
visions and the surrounding circumstances demand the inference that
an agreement or understanding existed that the powers would not be
exercised and the conclusion that the transfers were of future
interests.
It might seem that denying the annual exclusion for transfers sub-
ject to lapsing demand powers is inconsistent with allowing the exclu-
sion for transfers subject to nonlapsing demand powers, because the
donee of a lapsing power is potentially subject to the same tax conse-
quences as the holder of a nonlapsing power.370 The disparate treat-
ment is appropriate, however, for several reasons. First, if a lapsing
demand power lacks substance for purposes of the annual exclusion, it
should follow that the purported donee of the power should not be
considered to possess the power for other tax purposes. Second, if that
were not the case, the donee will suffer no gift or estate tax conse-
quences unless the property subject to the lapsing power exceeds the
greater of $5,000 or five percent of the value of the property from
which it can be satisfied.371 Lapsing demand powers are often limited
368. Crummey v. Commissioner, 397 F.2d 82, 87-88 (9th Cir. 1968).
369. Fondren v. Commissioner, 324 U.S. 18, 20 (1945).
370. See note 317 supra.
371. I.R.C. §§ 2514(e), 2041(b)(2); see generally Huff, supra note 317; Wilson, supra
note 317.
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in amount so as to receive the protection of the "five and five" provi-
sions. The income tax consequences of lapsing demand powers admit-
tedly are less certain because I.R.C. § 678 does not contain a five and
five exception.3 72 Third, transfers subject to lapsing demand powers
would rarely be used in the gift context if the annual exclusion were
not allowed for transfers subject to such powers. Finally, not every
transfer that has tax consequences to the donee is or should be enti-
tled to the annual exclusion. A donee who is given a testamentary
general power of appointment must include the value of the property
subject to the power in his estate at death,3 7 3 but the transferor of
property subject to such a power will not be entitled to the annual
exclusion.
The transfer of property subject to a lapsing demand power fails to
satisfy the first requirement of the annual exclusion test; it is not the
transfer of a present interest when considered in light of the substance
over form doctrine.
2. Internal Revenue Service's Post-Crummey Position 74
The I.R.S. approved use of demand powers to obtain the annual
exclusion in Revenue Ruling 73-405:375
[It is not the actual use, possession, or enjoyment by the donee which marks
the dividing line between a present and a future interest, but rather the right
conferred upon the donee by the trust instrument to such use, possession, or
enjoyment. A gift in trust to a minor is not a "future interest" if the donee has
a present right to the use, possession or enjoyment, although such use, posses-
sion, or enjoyment may require the appointment of a legal guardian. [citations
omitted]
[Ilt is now concluded that a gift in trust for the benefit of a minor should
not be classified as a future interest merely because no guardian was in fact
appointed. Accordingly, if there is no impediment under the trust or local law
to the appointment of a guardian and the minor donee has a right to demand
distribution, the transfer is a gift of a present interest that qualifies for the
annual exclusion allowable under section 2503(b) of the Code.3 7 6
Crummey, Gilmore, and Kieckhefer were cited as support without dis-
cussion or distinction. But those cases involved the transfer of prop-
erty subject to different demand rights that justified different tax
results.
Revenue Ruling 73-405 was ostensibly issued to revoke an earlier
372. Gissel & Rosepink, supra note 11, at 138-40; Wilson, supra note 317, at 313-17.
373. See I.R.C. § 2041.
374. The Internal Revenue Service has issued numerous rulings in connection with
the tax consequences of lapsing demand powers. See Gissel & Rosepink, supra
note 11 (reviewing numerous administrative rulings issued in connection with
demand powers). No good purpose would be served by a review of all the rulings
in this article. Only the most significant revenue rulings are discussed.
375. Rev. RUl. 73-405, 1973-2 C.B. 321.
376. Id. (citations omitted).
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ruling that had denied the annual exclusion for a gift in trust for a
minor where no guardian had been appointed. The Service adopted
the approach taken in Kieckhefer and Gilmore; appointment of a
guardian at the time of the transfer was not necessary as long as a
guardian could be appointed. The ruling took an objective approach
consistent with Kieckhefer. The focus was on the existence of the de-
mand right; on the "right to enjoy," rather than on actual enjoyment.
The existence of someone capable of making a demand was not re-
quired as long as a guardian could be appointed. Crummey, which re-
quired a finding that someone was legally and technically capable of
exercising the power, need not have been cited as authority in the
ruling.
The Service did not explicitly state in the ruling that a transfer of
property subject to a lapsing demand power would be considered a gift
of a present interest for purposes of the annual exclusion. Crummey,
however, was cited as authority. If the Service had not cited Crum-
mey, it could have limited the exclusion to the transfer of property
subject to nonlapsing demand powers as had been granted in Kieck-
hefer and Gilmore. The Service could have rejected Crummey and
used the substance over form doctrine to deny the exclusion for trans-
fers subject to lapsing demand powers.
In Revenue Ruling 81-7,377 the I.R.S. moved away from the objec-
tive approach it had taken in Revenue Ruling 73-405, by relying on
Fondren and Disston in ruling that the circumstances under which a
gift is made, as well as the terms of the trust, must be considered in
determining allowance of the annual exclusion for transfers subject to
lapsing demand powers. If property transferred in trust is subject to
limitations on present enjoyment in the form of conditions, contingen-
cies, or the will of another, either under the terms of the trust or other
circumstances, the interest will be considered a future interest.37 8
Moreover, the annual exclusion will be denied if the facts and circum-
stances show that the donor did not intend to give the donee a present
interest.379
The Service acknowledged in Revenue Ruling 81-7 that the annual
exclusion could be obtained for the transfer of property subject to a
donee's demand power, but indicated the substance over form doctrine
could be used to deny the exclusion notwithstanding the demand right
(the form) that was apparently granted.3 8 0 The Service concluded
that a donor who failed to inform the donee of the demand right and
restricted the time for exercise to three days had not given the donee a
377. Rev. Rul. 81-7, 1981-1 C.B. 474 (the ruling substantially restated Tech. Adv. Mem.
79-46-007 (July 26, 1979)).
378. Id.
379. Id.
380. IM
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reasonable opportunity to learn of or to exercise the power.38 1 The
demand right, consequently, was illusory and the donee had effec-
tively been deprived of the power. Notwithstanding the form, the
transfer, in substance, was of a future interest.
In Revenue Ruling 83-108382 the Service for the first time in a reve-
nue ruling38 3 explicitly allowed the annual exclusion for a transfer
subject to a lapsing demand power.
The I.R.S.'s post-Crummey position is that the transfer of property
subject to a lapsing demand power can qualify for the annual exclu-
sion. The mere grant of a lapsing demand power in a trust instrument,
however, will not be conclusive. The I.R.S. will employ the substance
over form doctrine to determine whether the annual exclusion should
be allowed. The terms of the trust and the circumstances surrounding
the transfer will be examined. The I.R.S. has focused primarily on the
length of the demand period and the adequacy of notice in determin-
ing the substance of transfers subject to lapsing demand rights.38 4
3. Reciprocal Lapsing Demand Powers
The I.R.S. addressed availability of the annual exclusion for trans-
fers in trusts containing reciprocal lapsing demand powers in Revenue
Ruling 85-24.385 A, B, and C were partners in X partnership. A estab-
lished a trust and contributed $20,000. Trust income was to be accu-
mulated for the benefit of A's child subject to the trustee's power to
make distributions in certain circumstances. Accumulated income
and principal were to be distributed to A's child when the child at-
tained age forty. A's child was given a lapsing right to withdraw up to
$10,000 of any addition to the trust. A's partners, B and C, were given
lapsing rights to withdraw up to $5,000 of any addition to the trust.
The rights of withdrawal lapsed after sixty days. B and C had no
rights in the trust other than the lapsing demand rights. B and C cre-
381. Id
382. Rev. Rul. 83-108, 1983-2 C.B. 168. The Service allowed the exclusion for a transfer
subject to a lapsing demand power for the year of transfer, even though the donee
was not informed of the power until the following year. The trustee was required
to notify the donee of the demand right within ten days of creation of the trust.
The Service distinguished Rev. Rul. 81-7 on the basis that the notice requirement
was not to preclude the donee from exercising the right, but rather to ensure that
the donee would have the opportunity to exercise the power during the demand
period triggered by the notice.
383. The I.R.S. previously had allowed the annual exclusion for transfers subject to
lapsing demand powers in numerous private rulings. E.g., Priv. Ltr. Rul. 80-47-
131 (Aug. 29, 1980); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 80-44-080 (Aug. 11, 1980); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 80-06-
109 (Nov. 20, 1979); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 78-26-049 (Mar. 29, 1978); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 77-42-
080 (July 25, 1977).
384. See Gissel & Rosepink, supra note 11.
385. Rev. Rul. 85-24, 1985-1 C.B. 329.
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ated similar trusts for their children at the same time, giving their
children and their partners similar rights of withdrawal.
Taxpayer A claimed annual exclusions in the amount of $20,000 as
a result of the lapsing demand rights given to his child and partners.
The I.R.S. acknowledged that "[w]hen a trust instrument gives a bene-
ficiary the power to demand immediate possession of the corpus, the
beneficiary has received a present interest."38 6 But form was not con-
clusive. Continuing its move away from the objective approach of
Revenue Ruling 73-405, the Service stated that the substance of the
transaction controls for gift tax purposes.
The Service cited Revenue Ruling 81-7 for the principle that the
annual exclusion would be denied if the facts and circumstances show
that the donor did not intend to give the donee a present interest or if
the demand right was illusory. The Service also discussed the recipro-
cal trust doctrine as articulated by the Supreme Court in United States
v. Estate of Grace.3 8 7 If two donors establish similar trusts under cir-
cumstances such that the beneficial interests are matching, the trans-
fers will be treated as reciprocal whether or not the transfers were
actually in consideration of each other.
The Service ruled that A's grant of a lapsing power of withdrawal
to B was offset by B's grant of a similar power to A. No gift was made
by A to B because the reciprocal powers were based upon adequate
consideration. When the powers given to partners B and C lapsed, ad-
ditional gifts by A to his child became complete. A's total gifts to his
child, consequently, were $20,000, $10,000 in excess of the annual ex-
clusion amount.
Revenue Ruling 85-24 is consistent with the reciprocal gift and gifts
through intermediaries decisions.388 In all of these cases the sub-
stance of the transaction must be determined; the form of the transac-
tion is not conclusive of the tax result. The illusory transfer doctrine
and reciprocal trust doctrine are simply variations of the substance
over form doctrine that the Service and courts must use in the proper
administration of the tax laws.
The transfers subject to the reciprocal lapsing demand powers in
Revenue Ruling 85-24 represented nothing more than a thinly dis-
guised attempt to obtain multiple annual exclusions for indirect trans-
fers. The ruling is consistent with the decision in Heyen 38 9 that gifts
through intermediaries will be disregarded in order that the true do-
nee can be identified. Instead of the act of conveyance required of the
intermediaries in Heyen, inaction on the part of the donees of lapsing
386. Id. at 330.
387. 395 U.S. 316 (1969).
388. See notes 219-57 and accompanying text supra.
389. Heyen v. United States, 945 F.2d 359 (10th Cir. 1991).
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demand powers was all that was needed to complete the indirect
transfers in Revenue Ruling 85-24.
The Service should have relied upon the substance over form doc-
trine in Revenue Ruling 85-24, rather than concluding that no gift was
involved because the transfers were based upon adequate considera-
tion. What if only one of the partners had established a trust but had
given his partners lapsing demand powers?390 The basis of the ruling
then would not suffice. The Service would have had to use the sub-
stance over form doctrine to deny the annual exclusions on the basis
of an inferred agreement or understanding that the lapsing demand
powers would not be exercised. It would have had to rule that the
lapsing demand powers given to the partners were simply devices by
which the taxpayer intended to make indirect gifts, in excess of the
annual exclusion amount, to his child free of gift tax.
E. Naked and Semi-Naked Lapsing Demand Powers
1. Internal Revenue Service's Position
As lapsing demand powers became more commonly used to obtain
the annual exclusion, the question arose whether the donee of the
power had to have a continuing interest in the trust in order for the
transferor to obtain the annual exclusion.391 Would the transfer of
390. Richard B. Covey, Recent Developments Concerning Estate, GifA and Income
Taxation - 1985, 20 INsT. ON EsT. PLAN. 1-1, 1-114 (1986).
391. See, e.g., John R. Price, The Uses and Abuses of Irrevocable Life Insurance Trusts,
14 INST. ON EsT. PLAN. 11-1, 11-35 to 11-36 (1980)("Usually [demand] powers are
only given to persons who have a substantial beneficial interest in the trust. If
powers were conferred on a broader range of persons, the IRS might attack them
as shams."). Mason, supra note 175, raised the issue in the context of the appro-
priateness of Crummey:
To assess whether the Crumney demand right rule is appropriate, one
must first analyze the most important Crummey drafting issue: must the
donee of a demand right have any relationship to the trust other than as
possessor of a demand right? In other words, could A obtain an exclu-
sion for Cs demand right by setting up a trust under which B gets the
income annually and the corpus in ten years, and C is given a right to
demand $10,000?
Id. at 590. Sherwin P. Simmons, Drafting the Crummey Power, 15 INST. ON EsT.
PLAN. 17-1 (1981) recognized the issue in practice:
In an effort to create an increased number of annual exclusions, some
practitioners have adopted the practice of naming as power holders per-
sons who are not real trust beneficiaries. For example, suppose there is
an irrevocable trust established for three minor beneficiaries. The donor
wants to make a gift to the trust of $60,000 and he wants to shield the gift
by the annual exclusion so as to avoid using any of his unified credit and
without paying any tax. How does he do it? Simply by making the gift
and naming as power holders 17 of his nephews and nieces in addition to
his three minor children. Inasmuch as there are 20 power holders, and,
assuming all other requirements for an effective Crummey power are
satisfied, there should be 20 annual exclusions.
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property subject to a naked lapsing demand power (the donee having
no right or interest in the trust after lapse of the power) or a semi-
naked lapsing demand power (the donee having limited rights or in-
terests in the trust after lapse of the power) qualify for the annual
exclusion?
The partners' reciprocal lapsing demand powers in Revenue Rul-
ing 85-24 were naked lapsing demand powers. The Service, however,
did not discuss the partners' lack of rights in the trust after lapse of
their withdrawal powers. The annual exclusion was denied on the ba-
sis that the transfers were for adequate consideration.
The I.R.S. has not issued a revenue ruling in which it has denied
the annual exclusion for transfers subject to naked or semi-naked
lapsing demand powers on the basis of the absence or limited nature of
the donees' interests in the trust after lapse of the powers. The I.R.S.
position is reflected in private administrative rulings.
In Technical Advice Memorandum 79-02-007392 the Service allowed
the annual exclusion for transfers subject to semi-naked lapsing de-
mand powers granted to the transferor's mother-in-law and father-in-
law. The parents-in-law had no enforceable rights in the continuing
trust after the lapse of the demand powers, although they could re-
ceive distributions of income or principal for their "benefit" in the
"absolute discretion" of the trustee. The Service did not suggest that
the lack of rights after lapse of the demand powers had any effect on
allowance of the annual exclusion.
The Service allowed the annual exclusion for transfers subject to
naked and semi-naked lapsing demand powers that could be stripped
naked in Technical Advice Memorandum 80-03-152.393 A trust was es-
tablished under which the settlor's children and more remote de-
scendants were permissible distributees of income or principal. The
settlor's descendants and their spouses were given lapsing demand
powers over trust contributions. After the powers lapsed, the spouses
had no rights in the continuing trust and the descendants' rights could
be eliminated by the exercise of a power of appointment held by the
settlor's wife. The Service ruled, nonetheless, that annual exclusions
would be allowed for the transfers subject to the lapsing demand pow-
ers without any discussion of the rights of the donees in the continuing
trust.
In Technical Advice Memorandum 87-27-003394 the Service denied
the annual exclusion for transfers subject to naked and semi-naked
lapsing demand powers. A husband and wife created separate trusts
Id. at 17-12 (concluding that "there seems something inherently wrong with this
arrangement.")
392. Tech. Adv. Mem. 79-02-007 (Sept. 26, 1978).
393. Tech. Adv. Mem. 80-03-152 (October 29, 1979).
394. Tech. Adv. Mem. 87-27-003 (Mar. 16, 1987).
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for their two sons. Their expressed desire was that the property re-
main in trust for the benefit of their sons. Each trust granted the son
for whom it was established and the son's spouse, issue, daughters-in-
law, and sons-in-law lapsing demand powers. The sons' in-laws had no
interest in the trust other than the lapsing demand powers. The sons'
children had only remote contingent remainder interests in the trusts
after lapse of their powers. Eighteen people, including the sons, were
granted lapsing demand powers. The Service stated that the sixteen
family members had been added as beneficiaries simply to avoid the
federal gift tax through a proliferation of annual exclusions and that
"[i]n substance the gifts were intended for the donor's sons C and D."
The substance over form doctrine was thus invoked. The problem for
the Service was to articulate a basis for denial of the exclusion given
case law and its prior rulings.
The Service first distinguished Kieckhefer, Gilmore, and Crum-
mey, on the facts, from the taxpayer in the ruling. It noted that in
those cases the minors who had been given demand powers had a ben-
eficial interest in accumulated trust income and usually an interest in
trust corpus after lapse of the demand power. In none of the cases did
the beneficiary have only a demand power and nothing more, as was
the case in the ruling.
The Service then noted that in Helvering v. Hutchings95 the
Supreme Court had allowed separate annual exclusions for gifts of
present interests to beneficiaries in trust, because the annual exclu-
sion was allowed on a per-donee basis for outright transfers. The
Court's holding avoided the necessity of creating separate trusts for
each beneficiary in order to obtain the separate exclusion. Hutchings,
however, did not, according to the Service, support allowance of multi-
ple exclusions in the ruling:
[Tihe question is whether Congress could have intended that rule [that the
annual exclusion applied to each beneficiary of the trust] to apply in the in-
stant case, where none but a single beneficiary of each trust, the grantors' son,
had a continuing interest in the trust? It is one thing to conclude, as the Court
did, that separate annual exclusions should be allowed for gifts in trust where
the donors could have accomplished the same end by creating a separate trust
for each beneficiary or by giving each beneficiary a pro rata share of the prop-
erty outright. It is quite another to conclude that several annual exclusions
should be allowed where it would be impossible for the donors to accomplish
the same end by creating a separate trust for each beneficiary or by making
separate gifts of the property outright.3 9 6
The Service allowed the annual exclusion for transfers subject to
the adult sons' demand powers, but only for transfers subject to the
demand of the other donees where the powers were exercised.
395. 312 U.S. 393 (1941).
396. Tech. Adv. Mem. 87-27-003 (March 16, 1987).
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In Private Letter Ruling 88-06-063397 the Internal Revenue Service
again allowed annual exclusions for transfers subject to lapsing de-
mand powers where the donees could be stripped naked of their rights
in the continuing trust.
The Service allowed annual exclusions for transfers subject to
semi-naked lapsing demand powers in Private Letter Ruling 90-30-
005.398 Taxpayer A proposed the establishment of a trust of which B
would be trustee. During A's life, trust income would be distributed
to B, if living, or if not, to B's children, if any. The trustee could use
trust principal for B's support, health, and education and could also
make discretionary distributions for B's children's special needs and
college and postgraduate education. Upon A's death the trust estate
would be distributed to B, if living, or if not, one-half to B's children
and one-half to A's son, if living. B and B's children were granted
lapsing demand powers over transfers to the trust. The Service al-
lowed annual exclusions for transfers subject to B's children's lapsing
demand powers without any discussion of their limited rights in the
trust after lapse of their powers.
In Technical Advice Memorandum 90-45-002399 the Service re-
turned to the issue of whether the annual exclusion would be allowed
for the transfer of property subject to naked and semi-naked lapsing
demand powers. Husband and wife transferred $391,250 in trust dur-
ing a period of four years. The transfers were subject to fourteen laps-
ing demand powers. Taxpayers claimed fourteen annual exclusions.
If the exclusions were allowed, no taxable gifts were made.
The Service repeated much of what it had said in Technical Advice
Memorandum 87-27-003 but expanded on its earlier ruling in an im-
portant respect. It employed the substance over form doctrine to infer
the existence of an agreement or understanding between the parties
that the lapsing demand powers would not be exercised:
Under the facts of this case, where the nominal beneficiaries (other than the
Son and the Daughter) enjoyed only remote contingent rights to the remain-
der, there is no imaginable reason why one of them would not have exercised
his withdrawal rights unless there existed some kind of an understanding
with the Donors that no one would do so, or they knew that doing so would
397. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 88-06-063 (Nov. 19, 1987). The donees had the right to income from
their separate shares and a testamentary special power of appointment. The
trustees, however, had the right to terminate the trusts by unanimous decision
after expiration of the demand period. If the trustees exercised that power, all
trust assets would be distributed to the donor's children, if living. The donor's
children were the sole trustees. The donees of the lapsing demand powers, conse-
quently, could be stripped naked by unanimous action of the trustees. Nonethe-
less, the Service allowed the annual exclusions without discussion of the possible
effect of the trustees' power.
398. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-30-005 (April 19, 1990).
399. Tech. Adv. Mem. 90-45-002 (July 27, 1990).
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result in undesirable consequences of some kind, or both.4 °
The Service inferred the existence of an agreement or understanding
in a manner similar to that used by the courts under I.R.C.
§ 2036(a)(1).401 The Service concluded that most of the donees were
granted lapsing demand powers "simply to avoid the federal gift tax
through a proliferation of annual exclusions."402 The annual exclu-
sion was allowed only for the transfers subject to the demand rights
granted to the "primary" trust beneficiaries.
2. Estate of Cristofani v. Commissioner4O3
Maria Cristofani wished to give certain income-producing real
property to her two adult children.40 4 The property's value was ap-
proximately $280,000.405 An outright gift of the property to the chil-
dren would have greatly exceeded the two $10,000 annual exclusions
available to Cristofani for gifts to her children. Because of the sub-
stantial size of her estate it was decided that the annual exclusion
would be used.40 6
On June 12, 1984, Cristofani executed an irrevocable trust.40 7 Cris-
tofani's two adult children were the trustees.4 08 Cristofani's two adult
children and five minor grandchildren were each given the right to
withdraw contributions to the trust, but not in excess of the annual
exclusion amount.40 9 The grandchildren were three, six, nine, ten,
and twelve years of age at the time of the first transfer.4 10 The with-
drawal period lasted fifteen days.411 The parents, as trustees, were re-
quired to notify their children of their demand rights.412 The parents
were legal guardians of the person of their children.413 No demand
was ever made.414
Cristofani's two children were entitled to all income of the continu-
ing trust.41 5 The trustees could also distribute principal to themselves
400. Tech. Adv. Mem. 90-45-002 (July 27, 1990).
401. See notes 176-83 and accompanying text supra.
402. Tech. Adv. Mem. 90-45-002 (July 27, 1990).
403. 97 T.C. 74 (1991), acq. in result, 1992-1 C.B. 1, action on decision, 1992-09 (Mar. 23,
1992).
404. Fiore & Ramnsbacher, supra note 7, at 10.
405. IdA. at 11 (value of an undivided one-third interest discounted by 25% was $70,000;
consequently the undiscounted value of the entire property was $280,000).
406. Id. at 10.
407. Estate of Cristofani v. Commissioner, 97 T.C. 74, 75 (1991).
408. Id.
409. Id at 75-76.
410. See Id. at 75.
411. Id,
412. IdA. at 76.
413. Id. at 75.
414. Id. at 77.
415. Id. at 76.
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and "were to take into account several factors, including 'settlor's de-
sire to consider the settlor's children as primary beneficiaries and the
other beneficiaries of secondary importance.' "416 After Cristofani's
death the trust was to be distributed to Cristofani's children who sur-
vived her by 120 days, with a deceased child's share to go in trust to
such child's issue.417 After the grandchildren's demand rights lapsed,
they had only contingent remainder interests (contingent on the death
of their parent and upon their surviving Cristofani by 120 days).418
Cristofani died December 16, 1985.419 Both children survived Cris-
tofani by 120 days, and the trust was distributed to them in equal
shares.420
Cristofani conveyed undivided one-third interests in the real prop-
erty to the trust in 1984 and 1985.421 The value of the undivided inter-
ests in the property in both years was $70,000.422 Annual exclusions
were claimed for the entire value of the property transferred, as a re-
sult of the demand powers granted the children and grandchildren.42 3
The Internal Revenue Service allowed annual exclusions for the
transfers subject to the children's demand powers but denied the ex-
clusion for the transfers subject to the grandchildren's demand pow-
ers.42 4 The Tax Court allowed exclusions for transfers subject to the
demand powers granted to all donees.
The Tax Court held that the test set forth in Crumey was the
correct test.42 5 It read Crummey as a rejection of a likelihood of en-
joyment test:
As discussed in Crummey, the likelihood that the beneficiary will actually
receive present enjoyment of the property is not the test for determining
whether a present interest was received. Rather, we must examine the ability
of the beneficiary, in a legal sense, to exercise their right to withdraw trust
corpus, and the trustee's right to legally resist a beneficiary's demand for pay-
ment. Based upon the language of the trust instrument and the stipulations of
the parties, we believe that each grandchild possessed the legal right to with-
draw trust corpus and that the trustees would be unable to legally resist a
grandchild's withdrawal demand.4 2 6
The Tax Court used the two-part Stifel-Crummey test (the grant of a
demand right and the existence of someone capable of immediately
416. I&
417. I&
418. Id
419. Id. at 75.
420. IM at 76.
421. Id. at 77.
422. I& at 77; Fiore & Ramsbacher, supra note 7, at 11 ($70,000 value reflected a 25%
discount due to "claimed fractional, unmarketable interests" which was not sup-
ported by formal appraisals; the Service did not challenge the discounted value).
423. Estate of Cristofani v. Commissioner, 97 T.C. 74, 77 (1991).
424. IM at 77-78.
425. Id. at 81.
426. Id at 83 (citation omitted)(emphasis added).
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exercising the right). It held that both requirements were satisfied in
Cristofani.42 7
The Tax Court used I.R.S. administrative rulings to support its re-
sult. It cited Revenue Rulings 81-7 and 85-24 to show the Commis-
sioner's "recognition that a trust beneficiary's legal right to demand
immediate possession and enjoyment of trust corpus or income consti-
tutes a present interest in property for purposes of the annual exclu-
sion under section 2503(b)."428 The court did not note, however, that
the Service had indicated in both those rulings that the substance over
form doctrine would be used to determine whether the exclusion
would be allowed for transfers subject to lapsing demand powers. The
court also noted that the facts in Cristofani were similar to the facts
addressed by the Service in Private Letter Ruling 90-30-005429 in
which annual exclusions had been allowed for transfers subject to
semi-naked lapsing demand powers. The court, however, failed to
mention Technical Advice Memorandum 87-27-003 or 90-45-002, which
would have supported a different result.4
3 0
The Commissioner tried to distinguish the donees of the demand
powers in Crummey from the grandchildren donees in Cristofani on
the basis of their rights in the trusts after lapse of the demand powers.
The Commissioner argued that the donees in Crummey possessed sub-
427. HL at 83 ("each grandchild possessed the legal right to withdraw"). The court did
not discuss the grandchildren's ability to exercise the rights under local law, nor
the right of their legal guardians to exercise the rights. The opinion is written on
the assumption, however, that someone existed who could legally exercise the
rights. See Id. at 84.
428. Id, at 81.
429. Id. at 84 n.5.
430. See James C. Cavanaugh & Robert J. Preston, When Will Crummey Transfers to
Contingent Beneficiaries Be Excludable Present Interests?, 76 J. TAX'N 68, 69
(1992)(concluding that Tech. Adv. Menes. 87-27-003 and 90-45-002 involved facts
very similar to those in Cristofani). An issue raised by Cristofani is the ability of
taxpayers to rely on revenue rulings and private rulings. See Fiore & Ram-
sbacher, supra note 7, at 10 ("One of the most important issues considered by the
Tax Court in Cristofani was the Service's inappropriate administrative procedure
here-namely, developing new restrictions on Crummey powers via private letter
rulings that were in substantial conflict with published Revenue Rulings upon
which taxpayers traditionally have relied."). But was the Service's position in the
private rulings inconsistent with published revenue rulings? The private rulings
provide that the substance over form doctrine will be employed to determine the
substance of transfers subject to lapsing demand powers. The mere grant of a
lapsing demand power does not end the inquiry. If it did, the form selected by the
taxpayer would determine the tax result. Revenue Rulings 81-7 and 85-24 are
entirely consistent with such an approach. Another issue raised is the effect of
the Service's inconsistency in private rulings. That issue is beyond the scope of
this article. See generally Lawrence Zelenak, Should Courts Require the Internal
Revenue Service to Be Consistent?, 38 TAX L. REV. 411 (1985); Larry Maples &
Robert C. Elmore, How Consistent Does the IRS Have to Be?, TAX ADVISER, July
1991, 461.
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stantial future economic benefits in trust corpus and income in addi-
tion to the demand powers, while the grandchildren in Cristofani
were secondary beneficiaries431 who possessed only contingent re-
mainder interests after lapse of their powers.432 The court did not ac-
cept the Commissioner's characterization of the beneficiaries' rights in
Crummey, noting that the only way a beneficiary in Crummey was
certain to obtain trust corpus was through exercise of the demand
power.433 More importantly, the court concluded that Crummey does
not "require that the beneficiaries of a trust must have a vested pres-
ent interest or vested remainder interest in the trust corpus or in-
come, in order to qualify for the section 2503(b) exclusion."434
The Tax Court also rejected the Commissioner's argument that
Cristofani never intended to benefit the grandchildren and only gave
them demand rights in order to obtain the annual exclusion.435 The
court believed that the decedent had intended to benefit her
grandchildren.436 First, Cristofani's children could have predeceased
her and the grandchildren then would have received the remainder.43 7
Second, the grandchildren were given legal demand rights and events
might have occurred that would have prompted them to exercise those
rights.438 Finally, the fact that the trust provisions were intended to
obtain the annual exclusion did not change the result.439
The court's rejection of the Commissioner's argument that Cris-
tofani never intended to benefit her grandchildren must be read as a
refusal to use the substance over form doctrine. The court focused
primarily on the trust instrument 44 0 (the form) rather than on sur-
rounding circumstances, which might have led to the conclusion that
the substance of the transaction was inconsistent with its form.44 1
Perhaps the court concluded the substance over form doctrine
could not be used because the Commissioner had stipulated that the
431. Estate of Cristofani v. Commissioner, 97 T.C. 74, 82 (1991).
432. Id. at 83.
433. Id at 82.
434. Id at 83.
435. Id
436. Id.
437. Id.
438. Id at 84. The court suggested that Cristofani's children, or their respective fami-
lies, might have suddenly and unexpectedly been faced with economic hardship
or a child might have become insolvent, prompting the grandchildren to exercise
their demand powers in order to protect their interests from their parents' credi-
tors. While these possibilities might lend support to the court's conclusion if the
demand powers were nonlapsing, they do not when the limited period (fifteen
days) during which the lapsing powers could be exercised is considered.
439. Id
440. Id. at 84 ("In light of the provisions in decedent's trust, we fail to see how respon-
dent can argue that decedent did not intend to benefit her grandchil-
dren.") (footnote omitted).
441. Vlietstra, supra note 175, at 590.
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grandchildren in Cristofani had the same rights of withdrawal as the
adult children.442 If that was the case, the court erred. The stipula-
tion should be seen merely as an acknowledgement that the trust pur-
ported to grant the same demand powers to the children and
grandchildren. Examination of the substance of those powers is not
foreclosed by acknowledgement of the form employed. Indeed, the
Commissioner did not feel that he had conceded the validity of the
demand powers. The Commissioner cited Revenue Ruling 85-24 and
argued that the donees' failure to exercise the demand rights was evi-
dence of an illusory power or collusive agreement not to exercise the
powers.44 3
Perhaps the court concluded that the substance over form doctrine
was not applicable because it found "[t]here was no agreement or un-
derstanding between decedent, the trustees, and the beneficiaries that
decedent's grandchildren would not exercise their withdrawal rights
following a contribution to the children's trust."44 But did the court
impose the burden on the Commissioner to establish the existence of
such an agreement or understanding?445 Did the court refuse to infer
such an agreement or understanding after considering the terms of
the trust and the surrounding circumstances? Did it conclude that the
taxpayer had disproved the existence of an implied agreement or un-
derstanding? None of these critical questions are discussed in the
court's opinion.
Perhaps the court's frequent 44 6 and unnecessary" 7 rejection of the
likelihood of enjoyment test indicates the court did not appreciate the
difference between a likelihood of enjoyment test and the substance
over form doctrine. Under a likelihood of enjoyment test a court
would presumably determine whether the donee, notwithstanding re-
ceipt of title or unrestricted rights in property, was likely to presently
enjoy the property. The Seventh Circuit, in Kieckhefer, noted that
under such a test a gift of a present interest could never be made to a
minor:
[No illustration is given as to how a gift of a present interest could be made to
a minor of tender years. In fact, in oral argument, counsel for the Commis-
sioner, when pressed to give an illustration, was unable to do so other than to
suggest that it might be made to an existing guardian. But even so, the use,
possession or enjoyment of such a gift would not immediately fall to the mi-
442. Estate of Cristofani v. Commissioner, 97 T.C. 74, 82 (1991).
443. Fiore & Ramsbacher, supra note 7, at 11.
444. Estate of Cristofani v. Commissioner, 97 T.C. 74, 77 (1991).
445. See Cavanaugh & Preston, supra note 430, at 70 (suggesting Cristofani means the
Service must provide direct, objective evidence in order to establish the existence
of such an agreement).
446. Estate of Cristofani v. Commissioner, 97 T.C. 74, 80, 81, 83 (1991).
447. The court acknowledged that the Commissioner had not cited or relied on Stifel
(which is cited as standing for the likelihood of enjoyment test) in its brief. I& at
81.
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nor. It could only be used for his benefit and under the law of guardianship in
such amounts and at such times as the guardian might deem proper.4 4 8
The Seventh Circuit rejected such a test when it held that it was the
donee's right to enjoy, rather than actual enjoyment, that was deter-
minative for purposes of the annual exclusion. The Service reached
the same conclusion in Revenue Ruling 73-405.
Under the substance over form doctrine, the court must examine
the trust instrument and the surrounding circumstances to determine
whether the form is consistent with the substance of the transaction.
The question is not whether the donee is likely to presently enjoy an
unrestricted gift. The question is whether there was, in substance, an
unrestricted transfer. If an agreement or understanding existed that
the lapsing demand powers would'not be exercised, the rights are illu-
sory and lack substance. The court erred in Cristofani in failing to use
the substance over form doctrine" 9 to deny the annual exclusion for
transfers subject to semi-naked lapsing demand powers.450
In Commissioner v. Court Holding Co.451 the Supreme Court used
the substance over form doctrine and held that "[a] sale by one person
cannot be transformed for tax purposes into a sale by another by using
the latter as a conduit through which to pass title."452 Furst, Schultz,
and Heyen stand for the rule that a gift by one person cannot be trans-
formed for gift tax purposes into a gift by another by using the latter
as a conduit through which to pass title.
If Cristofani had transferred undivided fractional interests in the
property having a value of $10,000 to each of the grandchildren, and
they had conveyed the fractional interests to Cristofani's two children
within fifteen days, annual exclusions probably would have been de-
nied for the indirect gifts through intermediaries under the authority
of Heyen. The court could have inferred the existence of an agree-
ment or understanding that the property would be conveyed by the
intermediaries to the intended donees. The fact that the transfer by
the intermediaries in the case of lapsing demand powers is effected by
an act of omission (failure to exercise the lapsing demand power)
rather than an act of commission (execution of a deed) does not
448. Kieckhefer v. Commissioner, 189 F.2d 118, 121 (7th Cir. 1951).
449. See Fiore & Ramsbacher, supra note 7, at 14 (Counsel for the taxpayer in Cris-
tofani appears to concede the lack of substance of the lapsing demand powers by
asserting "[p]lanning and drafting guidelines for ensuring the availability of gift
tax annual exclusions necessarily must take into account the essentially fictional
nature of the Crummey withdrawal power, even though Cristofani strongly sup-
ports its viability.").
450. The court should also have denied the annual exclusion for the transfers subject
to the adult children's lapsing demand powers on the basis that they were trans-
fers of future interests. See notes 367-373 and accompanying text supra.
451. 324 U.S. 331 (1945).
452. Id. at 334.
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change the substance of the transaction, nor should it change the tax
result. Cristofani, objectively viewed, appears to be little more than a
sophisticated indirect transfer case in which the Tax Court in a 16-0
reviewed decision ignored the substance of the transaction and failed
to use common sense.453
3. Post-Cristofani Developments
In Technical Advice Memorandum 91-41-008,454 dated before, but
announced shortly after, the decision in Cristofani, the I.R.S. denied
the annual exclusion for transfers subject to semi-naked lapsing de-
mand powers.455 The taxpayer established trusts for her three chil-
dren and transferred property to the trusts having a value of $350,000
each year from 1984 through 1987. The taxpayer claimed thirty-five
annual exclusions as a result of lapsing demand powers granted to
children, grandchildren, and great-grandchildren. None of the de-
mand powers were ever exercised. The Service used the substance
over form doctrine and concluded that "[lt must be inferred that the
beneficiaries had reached a prior understanding with the donor that
the withdrawal rights would not be exercised." The existence of such
an understanding negated the substance of the demand rights.
45 6 An-
nual exclusions were allowed only for transfers subject to the with-
drawal powers of the three "primary" trust beneficiaries.
The I.R.S. did not appeal Cristofani and acquiesced in the result.45 7
In acting to recommend acquiescence in the result, however, the Ser-
vice appears to have flatly rejected the result in Cristofani:
The Service does not contest annual gift tax exclusions for Crummey pow-
453. See Harris & Jacobson, supra note 7, at 212-13 (referring to the grant of demand
powers to secondary/contingent beneficiaries as "the Cristofani strategy" and
suggesting that "[t]his format is especially beneficial where the grantor desires to
make transfers in trust substantially in excess of the annual exclusion available
for the number of primary beneficiaries.").
454. Tech. Adv. Mem. 91-41-008 (June 24, 1991).
455. The decedent established a trust for the benefit of her three children. Separate
trusts were maintained for each of the three children. The child for whom the
trust was established was entitled to trust income and was given a testamentary
special power of appointment to his or her spouse. If the power was not exer-
cised, the trust would be divided into separate trusts for the benefit of the de-
ceased child's issue then living or, if none, would augment the trusts for the other
children. The trust provided that the children and their issue or spouses each had
a twenty-day right to demand a pro rata share of every contribution, not to ex-
ceed, however, the annual exclusion amount. Decedent had three children and
twenty-three grandchildren.
456. See Cavanaugh & Preston, supra note 431, at 69 (suggesting that this ruling "may
signal a shift in the Service's line of attack from the economic interest of the
beneficiary to the legal existence of the withdrawal power itself.").
457. Acq., 1992-1 C.B. 1 ("Acquiescence 'in result' means acceptance of the Court but
disagreement with some or all the reasons assigned for the decision."); see also
Action On Decision 1992-09 (March 23, 1992).
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ers held by current income beneficiaries and persons with vested remainder
interests. However, the Service will deny exclusions for powers held by indi-
viduals who either have no property interests in the trust except for Crum-
mey powers, or hold only contingent remainder interests. To extend the gift
tax benefit of Crummey powers to beneficiaries with interests more remote
than current income or vested remainders would undermine significantly the
unified system of estate and gift taxation which Congress intended, and would
invite flagrant abuse in the future.4 5 8
The Service indicated it would litigate other cases in which the facts
indicate "a greater abuse" of the Crummey power than those in Cris-
tofani. And, in recognition of the limited success it might have in the
Ninth Circuit (the Crummey Circuit), the Service noted "preferably
outside the Ninth Circuit."45 9
If the donee of a lapsing demand power need not have a vested
present or remainder interest in the continuing trust as determined in
Cristofani, will the courts allow the annual exclusion for transfers
subject to naked lapsing demand powers? Will transfers subject to
lapsing demand powers held by donees with only contingent remain-
der interests, no matter how remote, always be considered present in-
terests? Practitioners are currently seeking to determine the
boundaries of the annual exclusion in light of C-ristofani.460
The I.R.S. and courts should not determine the substance of laps-
ing demand powers by examining the sufficiency of the "clothing"
that donors attach to lapsing demand powers. The Service's attempt
to distinguish primary and secondary beneficiaries is a fruitless en-
deavor that essentially concedes that form will be allowed to prevail
over substance. When the smoke clears, practitioners will provide do-
nees the minimum continuing interest that courts determine is neces-
sary to obtain the annual exclusion for what, in substance, is always
the transfer of a future interest and, in the Cristofani setting, also an
indirect transfer. Allowing the annual exclusion for transfers subject
458. Action On Decision 1992-09 (Mar. 23, 1992).
459. Id.
460. Counsel for Cristofani has suggested that Cristofani is authority:
[To support an increase in the number of $10,000 tax-free gifts by pro-
viding in the irrevocable trust that these Crummey withdrawal powers
(which are unlikely to be exercised) apply not only to children, but also
to more remote contingent beneficiaries, such as grandchildren and
spouses of direct descendants. In the above example, assume there are
also five grandchildren and that the children all are married (a total of
11 individuals). In such a case, the maximum amount of annual exclu-
sion gifts becomes $220,000! Thus, all intended beneficiaries, whether
"primary" (donors' children who receive the entire trust if they survive
the parents) or "secondary" (other heirs who only step in for a prede-
ceased child), can hold Crummey powers that provide annual exclu-
sions-even though never once does any heir withdraw the permitted
$10,000.
Fiore & Ramsbacher, supra note 7, at 14; see also Cavanaugh & Preston, supra
note 430; Harris & Jacobson, supra note 7.
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to lapsing demand powers is incompatible with an exclusion limited to
the transfer of present interests on a per-donee basis.
IV. ANNUAL EXCLUSION REFORM
A. The Need for Reform4 6
The annual exclusion is justified on the ground that taxpayers
should be allowed to make customary and occasional gifts of relatively
small value without having to pay a gift tax or file a gift tax return.
The exclusion provides a limited exemption from the gift tax. The
amount of the exclusion and the type of interest that qualifies for the
exclusion are important to accomplishing the exclusion's limited pur-
pose. A large exclusion with no limitations on qualifying interests
would impair the estate tax protective function of the gift tax. Con-
gress understood this and provided an annual exclusion limited in
amount on a per-donee basis for gifts of present interests in property.
The annual exclusion, however, has not always been administered
or enforced in a way that reflects these considerations. The exclusion
is currently allowed for the transfer of income interests and for the
transfer of property subject to lapsing demand powers. Allowing the
exclusion for such transfers is inconsistent with the purposes that led
to enactment of the exclusion and impairs the estate tax protective
function of the gift tax. The donees of such transfers may never re-
ceive any economic benefit from the transfers for which the annual
exclusion is allowed.462 Multiple indirect gifts in the annual exclusion
amount can be made to a single donee through the ruse of semi-naked
lapsing demand powers. Courts have all too often mistaken form for
substance with the result that the exclusion's future interest and per-
donee limitations have been compromised.
Reform should accomplish two goals. The first is simplification of
the annual exclusion;463 the law should be more certain.464 Taxpayers
461. Many have identified the need for annual exclusion reform and made specific
proposals. See, e.g., Adams, supra, note 73; Casner, supra note 79; Dodge, supra
note 89; Gutman, supra note 75; Mason, supra note 175; PEAT & WILLBANKS,
supra note 1; Pedrick, supra note 367; Ray, supra note 73; Rothberg, supra note
123; Sherman, supra note 10.
462. The donee of an income interest may die shortly after the income interest is cre-
ated and before receipt of any income. The donee of the lapsing demand power
may fail to exercise the power and have only a contingent remainder interest in
the continuing trust.
463. See Edward J. McCaffery, The Holy Grail of Tax Simplification, 1990 WIS. L.
REV. 1267, 1270-72 (1990). McCaffery suggests there are several different under-
standings of the term "tax simplification." He identified three types of complexi-
ties: "technical complexity" (the pure intellectual difficulty of ascertaining the
meaning of a tax law); "structural complexity" (the difficulty in interpreting and
applying rules to economic transactions, the room afforded for restructuring
transactions to achieve different tax treatment, and the variations in tax treat-
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should not have to guess whether a particular transfer would qualify
for the annual exclusion. Clear lines should exist over which even the
most aggressive of taxpayers would not dare to step. Use of formalis-
tic constructs by which future interests are converted into present in-
terests in order to obtain the annual exclusion should not be possible.
Gift and estate planning would be simplified if this goal is realized.
The number of cases in which courts would be required to determine
the substance of the transaction would be few. Compliance and en-
forcement costs would be minimal.
The second goal of reform is denial of the annual exclusion for the
transfer of certain interests for which it is currently allowed. Trans-
fers of income interests and transfers subject to lapsing demand pow-
ers (even if exercised)465 should not qualify for the annual exclusion.
Allowing the exclusion for such transfers allows abuse of the annual
exclusion. This abuse has two aspects. First, the exclusion is allowed
for the transfer of future interests. Second, the annual exclusion is
ment contingent on restructuring); and "compliance complexity" (record-keeping
and form-completing tasks a taxpayer must perform in order to comply with the
tax laws). He also suggested that tax simplification may depend on whether it is
considered from the perspective of the taxpayer, the tax preparer, the tax plan-
ner or adviser, the IRS, the courts, the legislative system, academics, or econo-
mists. The "simplification" advocated herein would reduce all three types of
complexities from the perspective of all parties identified.
464. See Willard H. Pedrick, Larger Bore Canons of Taxation for Federal Estate and
Gift Tax Revision, 10 INST. ON EsT. PLAN. 15-1, 15-2 (1976)(noting that Adam
Smith offered four "maxims" regarded as the Canons of Taxation, "that taxes
should: (1) Be proportionate to income; (2) Be certain and not arbitrary; (3) Be
convenient as to manner and time of payment; and (4) Be cheap to collect and not
calculated to encourage tax shenanigans...").
465. An argument can be made that the exclusion should be allowed for lapsing de-
mand powers that are actually exercised. See Dodge, supra note 89, at 345 ("IT]he
exclusion should be available if the minor in fact withdraws a cash amount equal
to or less than the grantor's prior trust transfer during the same year as the with-
drawal."). In Heyen the court allowed annual exclusions for two gifts that were
kept by the "intermediaries" because "the end result was different." In Techni-
cal Advice Memorandum 87-27-003 the Service allowed annual exclusions for
transfers subject to naked and semi-naked lapsing demand powers that were ex-
ercised. Exercise suggests the lapsing demand right had substance and was not
illusory. It could also be suggested that the exclusion should be allowed for exer-
cised lapsing demand powers because exercise eliminates abuse of the annual ex-
clusion associated with such powers. The donee, after exercise, owns the
property and has the right to use, enjoyment, and possession. Exercise prevents
accomplishment of indirect transfers (assuming the donee does not transfer the
property to an intended donee). These arguments have appeal. Under such an
approach, however, it would not be possible to determine whether the donor is
entitled to the exclusion on the date of the transfer. Lapsing demand powers,
moreover, would rarely be exercised. If the donor intended outright ownership
by the donee, he would not go to the expense of creating trusts with lapsing de-
mand powers. The tax system is better served by a flat rule denying the annual
exclusion for all transfers subject to lapsing demand powers.
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allowed for multiple indirect transfers in excess of the annual exclu-
sion amount, free of taxation, in violation of the per-donee limitation.
Allowance of the exclusion for these transfers impairs the estate tax
protective function of the gift tax. Reform should shore up the future
interest and per-donee limitations of the exclusion.
B. Proposed Reform
1. The Annual Exclusion Amount
If the gift tax is to accomplish its estate tax protective function and
the annual exclusion is to provide a limited exemption for customary
and occasional gifts of relatively small value, the amount of the exclu-
sion is important. If the exclusion is too low, gifts of relatively small
value will not be exempt and the exclusion will not accomplish its pur-
pose. If the exclusion is too high, transfers will be made in order to
avoid the estate tax and the estate tax protective function of the gift
tax will be impaired.
The $10,000 exclusion is sufficiently large that it can be used to
eliminate or significantly reduce transfer taxation. Every taxpayer
may give present interests in property having a value of $10,000 per
donee each year, to as many donees as desired, free of gift tax through
use of the annual exclusion. If a single taxpayer makes qualifying
gifts in the amount of $10,000 per year for ten years to ten donees,
$1,000,000 will have been removed from the donor's estate free of gift
and estate taxation.46 6 Future income from the property and post-gift
appreciation will also have been removed from the taxpayer's transfer
tax base.46 7 If the property transferred would have been subject to
estate taxation at the highest estate tax rate, $500,000 will have been
saved as a result of the gifts.468 Every gift of $10,000 will have elimi-
nated $5,000 of estate tax that otherwise would have been payable. If
the taxpayer was married and the spouses consented to gift-splitting,
twice as much could have been transferred free of transfer taxation,
doubling the tax savings.46 9
Our hypothetical donor with ten donees can transfer $1,000,000
free of gift and estate taxation each decade through routine use of the
annual exclusion. This amount far exceeds the $600,000 that can be
transferred free of gift or estate tax as a result of the unified credit.
An annual exclusion gifting program faithfully followed for several
466. This assumes that the transferred property is not required to be included in the
taxpayer's gross estate for estate tax purposes under I.R.C. §§ 2035-2038.
467. See PEAT & WILLBANKS, supra note 1, § 7.06, at 94.
468. The highest marginal gift and estate tax rate is currently 50%. I.R.C. § 2001(c).
469. See I.R.C. § 2513; Michael B. Lang, Gift-Splitting by Husband and Wife, 67 TAXES
623 (1989).
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decades can eliminate or significantly reduce a taxpayer's transfer tax
burden.
Taxpayers who are unable or unwilling to make full use of the an-
nual exclusion during their lives can aggressively make use of the ex-
clusion on their deathbeds. A taxpayer with a potential taxable estate
for estate tax purposes of $700,000, who has never made a taxable gift,
can use the annual exclusion immediately before death to transfer
$100,000 to ten donees ($10,000 each) and eliminate the $37,000 of es-
tate tax that would otherwise be incurred. Such use of the exclusion
as an estate tax avoidance device is clearly inconsistent with the pur-
poses that supported enactment of the exclusion. But such use will be
unavoidable under any exemption provided on a dollar basis unless
transfers within a short period before death are included in the gross
estate under a flat rule or if "in contemplation of death."470
The estate tax avoidance possibilities that exist through routine
use of the annual exclusion must be recognized when the amount of
the exclusion is considered. The benefits of the exclusion are limited
only by the taxpayer's ability and willingness to transfer property dur-
ing life, the number of individuals he desires to benefit, and the length
of his life. Many donors, moreover, apparently make routine maxi-
mum use of the exclusion to transfer investment-type assets and ig-
nore small customary gifts, as if such customary transfers are not
subject to the gift tax.471
It has been suggested that the annual exclusion should be "in the
range of $1,000 to $2,000, a level sufficient to exclude most routine gifts
without encouraging elaborate tax avoidance schemes" because a large
exclusion "induces tax avoidance and leads taxpayers to view the ex-
clusion as an entitlement."472 In 1990, the Joint Committee on Taxa-
tion proposed limiting the exclusion to $30,000 per year on a per-donor
basis.473
The exclusion should continue to be allowed on a per-donee basis.
If Taxpayer A can give each of his three children $10,000 per year free
of tax, Taxpayer B should be allowed to give each of his six children
470. See SOLOMON, supra note 21, § 7.02, at 345-48 (reviewing the history of estate tax-
ation of transfers near death).
471. See Casner, supra note 79, at 9-3 ("Some people say, 'Well, I can give up to
$3,000'-the annual gift tax exclusion. But they give $3,000 and, in addition, they
provide the child with a great many other things during the year that are
gifts.")(footnote omitted); Cooper, supra note 7, at 234 ("In practice, however, the
annual exclusion is not used by tax planners to cover casual or support transac-
tions. Instead, the working assumption seems to be that gifts of cash or liquid
assets ... can be made on top of casual and support transactions, which are simply
ignored."); Parker, supra note 85, at 13-3.
472. PEAT & WILLBANKs, supra note 1, § 7.06, at 92; see also Pedrick, supra note 367, at
951 (suggesting that an exclusion of $3,000 might be sufficient to serve the exclu-
sion's original purpose).
473. Harrison, supra note 7, at 376 n.51.
[Vol. 72:106
GIFT TAX ANNUAL EXCLUSION
$10,000 per year free of tax. While B can transfer twice as much free
of the transfer tax system as A if he makes these transfers, the per-
donee approach is consistent with the original purpose of exempting
customary or occasional gifts from the gift tax. Such gifts are usually
made on a per-donee basis on special occasions (e.g. birthdays, wed-
dings, anniversaries, Christmas) and during the year by expenditures
in excess of the taxpayer's obligation of support. If it is believed that
the amounts being transferred through use of the exclusion are too
large, the exclusion amount, not the per-donee nature of the exclu-
sion, should be changed.
Congress increased the annual exclusion in 1981 to $10,000, recog-
nizing the reduced value of the annual exclusion due to inflation. Be-
cause the exclusion is not indexed for inflation, the value of the
exclusion decreases as the purchasing power of the dollar declines. If
the exclusion had been indexed to the Consumer Price Index for All
Urban Consumers (CPI-U) in 1981, it would be approximately $15,000
today.474 The exclusion, consequently, has lost approximately one-
third of its value since 1981.
The exclusion amount, nonetheless, should not be increased. A
$10,000 per-donee annual exclusion should be adequate to cover the
customary and occasional gifts of relatively small value made by the
vast majority of taxpayers. The $10,000 exclusion, combined with the
tuition and medical expense exclusion, should enable most taxpayers
to make customary and occasional gifts and to provide comfortable
support for family members without gift tax concerns. 475
Increasing the amount is not warranted for a second reason. Many
donors apparently disregard customary gifts for tax purposes and
make full use of the annual exclusion to transfer investment assets.476
That practice is likely to continue under any exclusion that is provided
on a dollar basis unless the Internal Revenue Service changes its en-
forcement practices. By limiting the exclusion to $10,000 in current
dollars, approximately one-third of the potential for such abuse will
have been eliminated as result of inflation since 1981. An increase in
the exclusion amount would expand the potential for abusing the
exclusion.
Although the $10,000 exclusion can be used to achieve substantial
gift and estate tax savings, reducing the exclusion amount is not neces-
sary. The generous amount of the exclusion suggests that Congress
474. See CPI Detailed Report Data for March 1992, U.S. Dept. of Labor, 69 (May
1992)(if the $10,000 exclusion had increased at the same rate as the CPI-U from
1981 through 1991 the exclusion would have been $14,980 on January 1, 1992).
475. See Stephen S. Case, Lifetime Gifting Strategies After ERTA, 16 INST. ON EST.
PLAN. 12-1, at 12-11 (1982).
476. See note 471 supra.
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may have intended to err on the high side in setting the amount of the
exclusion. Reduction of the amount would be politically difficult.
The $10,000 annual exclusion, consequently, is an appropriate
amount. It affords the intended exemption from gift taxation. While
this amount permits some leakage from the transfer tax system, it will
not seriously impair the estate tax protective function of the gift tax if
the future interest and per-donee limitations of the exclusion are en-
forced. The exclusion, however, should be indexed for inflation if it is
to continue to be sufficient to exempt customary and occasional gifts
and enable taxpayers to comfortably support family members without
gift tax concerns.
2. Qualifying Interests
If the gift tax is to achieve its estate tax protective function and the
annual exclusion is to provide a limited exemption for customary and
occasional gifts of relatively small value, the type of interest that qual-
ifies for the exclusion is important. If all transfers qualified for the
exclusion, transfers that possess none of the characteristics of custom-
ary and occasional gifts will be made simply to avoid the estate tax.
In deciding which interests should qualify for the annual exclusion
the following questions should be answered: If there were no income,
gift or estate taxes, what gifts would most individuals make? What
would be the characteristics of gifts that would be made in such a tax-
free world? Finally, how would such gifts be made?
In a tax-free world, the average individual might make numerous
gifts. He might buy his ten-year-old daughter a ten-speed bicycle or
his sixteen-year-old son a used automobile. He might give his adult
daughter $5,000 as a wedding gift. He might send his children to pri-
vate schools or provide private music lessons. He might take his mi-
nor and adult children with him to Hawaii for vacation. He might
spend $500 for each of his children at Christmas. He might give a
niece a $100 birthday gift.
The primary characteristic of all these customary and occasional
gifts is that the donees would receive the immediate use, enjoyment,
and possession of the gifts and expenditures. They would receive "the
right to substantial present economic benefit." Customary and occa-
sional gifts will almost always be gifts of present interests.477
In a tax-free world, donors would rarely make future-interest gifts.
The donor would retain title and control of his property and its in-
come until the gift was appropriate and immediate use, enjoyment,
and possession was intended. Circumstances might change, and the
gift might no longer be prudent. Owners would maintain their op-
477. Sherman, supra note 10, at 590.
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tions. If tax advantages did not exist, gifts would not be made prema-
turely. Most wealth would be transferred at death.
Customary and occasional gifts are typically made by delivery and
conveyance of title. The daughter would receive possession of the bi-
cycle; the son would receive title to the car. The adult daughter would
deposit the wedding gift in her personal bank account. Customary and
occasional gifts are almost always made outright to the donee; legal
and equitable title are not separated.478 Christmas, wedding, and occa-
sional small gifts intended for immediate use, enjoyment, or posses-
sion by the donee are simply not made in trust.
In a tax-free world, income interests would rarely be transferred
inter vivos. If the donor wished to provide another the income from
property, he would retain title and simply give the income to the do-
nee as it was earned.
In a tax-free world no one would give a three-year-old child (or the
child's guardian) a fifteen-day lapsing demand power over contribu-
tions to a trust in which the child had only a contingent remainder
interest after the lapse of the power. No one would give unrelated
business partners lapsing demand powers over contributions to trusts
in which the partners had no interest other than the powers. What
would be the purpose of such powers? If the donor intended the child
or the partners to have the immediate use, enjoyment, or possession of
the property, he would give the property directly to the child (or the
child's guardian) or partners.
Two classes of gifts are identified when these questions are an-
swered: Gifts that are not tax-motivated and gifts that are made pri-
marily to obtain some tax benefit. Only the first class of gifts,
motivated by pure donative intent, should be excluded, within certain
dollar limits, from gift taxation by the annual exclusion. The annual
exclusion, therefore, should be limited to gifts of present interests in
property: Gifts that give the donee the immediate "right to enjoy" the
property; gifts that give the donee "the right to substantial present
economic benefit." Transfers of future interests in property should
not qualify for the exclusion.
This analysis might suggest that an intent test similar to the one
required under the discredited "in contemplation of death" provision
of the 1916 estate tax be adopted. It could be argued that only under
such a test could it be certain that allowing an exclusion was appropri-
ate. That is not, however, the proposal. Courts should not be required
to make such determinations. Crummey and Cristofani demonstrate
that courts are no more likely to reach reasoned decisions in this area
than were courts required to use the "in contemplation of death"
standard.
478. Sherman, supra note 10, at 666-67.
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Forty years ago it was suggested that a subjective intent test be
avoided in connection with the annual exclusion:
While the necessity of extracting an "intent" from ambiguous wills is the
unenviable burden of a probate court, it can scarcely be recommended as an
aid to efficiency in routine tax administration....
Where possible, the intent rule should be rejected in tax cases. It is so
much simpler to decide "What did the taxpayer do?" than "What did he intend
to do?" It is also simpler to decide "What rights did the infant get?" than
"Was he old enough and smart enough to exercise his rights effectively?" 4 7 9
An objective test, consistent with underlying tax policies, should be
established.48 0 Or, perhaps more accurately, the current objective test
should be applied with common sense by the courts.48 '
But the objective approach must not be turned into a search for
mere form without consideration of substance. Taxpayers will con-
tinue to attempt to avoid the future interest and per-donee limitations
of the exclusion by carefully structuring trusts and transfers. Until
Congress provides a more tightly drawn statute, the I.R.S. and the
courts should use the substance over form doctrine in determining
whether to allow the exclusion.
A fourth requirement should be added to the three-part annual ex-
clusion test to provide the desired objective test.482 In addition to
proving that the interest transferred is a present interest, that the do-
nee is identifiable, and that the value of the present interest is ascer-
tainable, the donor should have to prove that the donee received the
property outright483 or, if the transfer is in trust, that the property
was subject to the donee's nonlapsing demand power4 84 and that the
donee was the only trust beneficiary.
The fourth requirement arises from the manner in which custom-
ary and occasional gifts of relatively small value are typically made;
such gifts are usually made outright and not in trust. The donee re-
ceives title to the property transferred. No one other than the donee
has rights in the gifts. A consequence of conveying title is that the
479. Rogers, supra note 312, at 502.
480. See Dodge, supra note 89, at 245 ("An intractable line-drawing problem is best
solved not by attempting to refine it, but by defining it away with rules that make
line-drawing irrelevant, provided that fundamental tax policy concerns are not
significantly undermined.").
481. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(g)(1)(as amended in 1986).
482. See notes 184-86 and accompanying text supra.
483. See Sherman, supra note 10, at 666 (proposing that the definition of "future inter-
est" be changed so that the exclusion would be allowed only if the donee received
the entire legal and equitable title to the property).
484. The Joint Committee on Taxation has proposed a change in the definition of
"present interest" that would require that demand powers be exercisable during
the donee's lifetime in order that transfers subject to such powers qualify for the
annual exclusion. Harrison, supra note 7, at 386 n.109; Moore, supra note 317, at
11-30.
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donee becomes the owner of the property for income, gift, estate, and
generation-skipping transfer tax purposes.
Congress has taken a similar approach in connection with the gen-
eration-skipping transfer tax (GSTT) in I.R.C. § 2642(c). When the
GSST was enacted in 1986, transfers that qualified for the annual ex-
clusion for gift tax purposes received an inclusion ratio of zero for pur-
poses of the GSST.485 Congress subsequently provided, however, that
nontaxable gifts to an individual in trust would not receive a zero in-
clusion ratio, unless no trust income or corpus could be distributed to
or for the benefit of any person other than such individual during his
life and, if the trust did not terminate before the individual died, the
trust assets would be includible in the individual's gross estate.48 6
The amendment of § 2642(c) severely impacted use of lapsing de-
mand powers in the typical long-term, multi-generation Crummey
trust.48 7 Most trusts containing lapsing demand powers have more
than one beneficiary, and the assets will not be included in the donee's
estate. If a trust for multiple beneficiaries is to be free of the genera-
tion-skipping transfer tax, part of the transferor's generation-skipping
transfer tax exemption must be allocated to the transfer.48 8
The fourth requirement is also consistent with the exception to the
present interest requirement provided by § 2503(c). Obtaining the an-
nual exclusion under § 2503(c) comes at a cost. The property and its
income must be available for the use or benefit of the minor during
minority, must pass to the child at twenty-one, and must be included
in the minor's estate if the minor dies before the trust terminates.
Transfers in trust that do not satisfy the requirements of § 2503(c), but
485. Lawrence Brody, Putting a Premium on Generation-Skipping Transfer Tax
Planning - The Use of Life Insurance, 23 INST. ON EsT. PLAN. 10-1, at 10-49
(1989).
486. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 11703(c)(1),
(2), 104 Stat. 1388, 1388-517; Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988,
Pub. L. No. 100-647, § 1014(g)(17)(A), 102 Stat. 3342, 102-3566. I.R.C. § 2642(c)
currently provides:
(c) Treatment of certain direct skips which are nontaxable gifts.-
(1) In general-In the case of a direct skip which is a nontaxable gift,
the inclusion ratio shall be zero.
(2) Exception for certain transfers in trust-Paragraph (1) shall not
apply to any transfer to a trust for the benefit of an individual
unless-
(A) during the life of such individual, no portion of the corpus
or income of the trust may be distributed to (or for the ben-
efit of) any person other than such individual, and
(B) if the trust does not terminate before the individual dies, the
assets of such trust will be includible in the gross estate of
such individual.
Rules similar to the rules of section 2652(c)(3) shall apply for pur-
poses of subparagraph (A).
487. Gissel & Rosepink, supra note 11, at 133.
488. See I.R.C. §§ 2631, 2632.
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which qualify for the annual exclusion, should be subject to similar
requirements. Not surprisingly, a trust that satisfies the requirements
of § 2503(c) probably satisfies the requirements of § 2642(c). 48 9
Recognition of the fourth requirement would not preclude legiti-
mate use of the annual exclusion within the dollar limits determined
by Congress. Taxpayers could still make as many per-donee present
interest gifts each calendar year as desired. The additional require-
ment would eliminate annual exclusion abuse by providing clear rules
without adversely affecting legitimate use of the exclusion.
C. Judicial Implementation
While courts cannot index the annual exclusion for inflation, they
could substantially implement the suggested reform through a rea-
soned application of the existing three-part annual exclusion test and
use of the substance over form doctrine. Common sense could be em-
ployed in order to rein in the current unwarranted allowance of the
exclusion.
The annual exclusion, as a matter of legislative grace, should be
strictly construed. Courts should insist that taxpayers satisfy their
burden of proof. The taxpayer must prove that the interest trans-
ferred is a present interest, that the donee is determinable, and that
the value of the present interest is ascertainable. Actuarial assump-
tions based on mortality tables should not be allowed in lieu of proof.
Gifts, being transactions almost exclusively within the family
group, should be carefully scrutinized to determine if they are, in sub-
stance, what they appear to be in form. Courts should infer the exist-
ence of an agreement or understanding between the donor and donee
where warranted on the facts. The burden of disproving the existence
of the agreement or understanding should be on the taxpayer.
The courts should recognize that any taxpayer who wishes to make
a present interest gift to a minor or an adult can do so in a number of
ways without any tax uncertainty. Property can be transferred out-
right to the donee. Property can be transferred to a guardian for a
minor or incapacitated person. Property can be transferred to a trust
over which the donee has a nonlapsing general power of appointment
and of which the donee is the only beneficiary. Property can be trans-
ferred in a manner that satisfies § 2503(c). Courts should recognize
that transfers that do not satisfy the proposed fourth requirement will
usually involve attempts to avoid the future interest and per-donee
489. See Lloyd Leva Plaine, The Million Dollar Question Under the Generation Skip-
ping Transfer Tax, 24 INST. ON EsT. PLAN. 4-1, 4-31 (1990)("An IRC Section
2503(c) minor's trust for a skip person should meet the TMRA-1988 provisions if
the instrument prohibited the use of trust distributions to discharge anyone else's
support obligations.")
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limitations of the exclusion. The attempts should fail under the sub-
stance over form doctrine.
But even if the courts took this approach, there would be signifi-
cant litigation and a lengthy period of uncertainty. The annual exclu-
sion has been allowed for the transfer of income interests since 1941
and for the transfer of property subject to lapsing demand powers
since 1968. It would be wasteful of judicial and administrative re-
sources to whittle away existing law on a case-by-case basis. Allowing
the annual exclusion for transfers of income interests and for trans-
fers subject to lapsing demand powers may be "too firmly established
to permit such a judicial modification."490 A legislative solution is
required.
D. Legislative Implementation
Congress should amend § 2503(b) to deny the annual exclusion for
transfers of income interests and for transfers subject to lapsing de-
mand powers by adopting the fourth requirement discussed above. It
should also index the current exclusion amount for inflation. Enact-
ing these changes would provide the objective approach desired under
§ 2503(b) and accomplish the goals of reform.
Proposed k.R.C. § 2503
§ 2503. Taxable gifts.
(a) General definition. - The term "taxable gifts" means the
total amount of gifts made during the calendar year, less the
deductions provided in subchapter C (section 2522 and
following).
(b) Exclusion from gifts.
(1) In the case of gifts made to any person by the donor
during the calendar year, the first $10,000 of such gifts to
such person shall not, for purposes of subsection (a), be
included in the total amount of gifts made during such
year.
(2) Paragraph (1) shall not apply to:
(A) gifts of future interests in property; or
(B) gifts in trust for the benefit of an individual
unless:
(i) the individual or his guardian (who need not
have been appointed at the time of the transfer)
has an immediately exercisable and nonlapsing
power to demand immediate distribution of the
property and the income therefrom; and
490. Mason, supra note 175, at 597. ("At a certain point, which Crummey has reached,
a rule of law becomes so widely accepted and relied upon that it is no longer
appropriate for a court to alter it. Such a rule must be changed, if at all, by Con-
gress."); see also Pedrick, supra note 367, at 949-50.
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(ii) during the life of such individual, no portion
of the corpus or income of the trust may be dis-
tributed to (or for the benefit of) any person
other than the individual.
Legal and equitable life estates and other rights to income shall be
considered future interests for purposes of (2)(A).
There are no proposed changes for subsections (c), (e), (f), or (g).
V. CONCLUSION
The annual exclusion is a necessary and appropriate incident of the
gift and estate tax system. Taxpayers should not have to render unto
Caesar for customary and occasional gifts of relatively small value.
Unfortunately, aggressive taxpayers have been allowed the annual
exclusion for transfers in certain circumstances that are inconsistent
with the limited purpose of the exclusion. The estate tax protective
function of the gift tax is impaired when the exclusion's future inter-
est and per-donee limitations are not enforced. Form has been al-
lowed to triumph over substance. The courts have too often failed to
use common sense in determining the availability of the exclusion.
Congress should enact the proposed amendment of I.R.C. § 2503
and index the $10,000 annual exclusion for inflation. If these propos-
als were adopted, the exclusion would accomplish its purpose of ex-
empting customary and occasional gifts of relatively small value from
the gift tax without impairing the estate tax protective function of the
gift tax. The amendment would strengthen the future interest and
per-donee limitations of the exclusion. The exclusion would no longer
be allowed for transfers of mere income interests or for transfers sub-
ject to lapsing demand powers. These changes would simplify gift and
estate planning and reduce administrative costs. The resulting annual
exclusion, in conjunction with the tuition and medical expense exclu-
sion, would enable most taxpayers to continue to make customary and
occasional gifts of modest value and to provide comfortable support
for family members without gift tax concerns and without adversely
affecting the estate tax protective function of the gift tax.
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